The members of the reformist movement Goran, who are targeted by a campaign of harassment from the Kurdistan's ruling party Patriotic Union, must brace themselves for a hard 2010 year.
Jalal Talabani, president of Iraq and leader of the PUK, spoke the 31/12/2009 in an interview about the party's relation with Nerchirvan Mustapha, Goran founder. "Nerchirvan Mustapha is an enemy of the PUK", did he say to the journalist of Sharq Awsat, one of the most important arab-language Iraqi publications. Asked if the was any possibility for the Patriotic Union to work with Mustapha's opposition list for the coming Iraqi national elections, mam Jalal said that Nerchirvan Mustapha was against the PUK and against Kurdistan region's government. He said Mustapha didn't want any kind of coalition, and accused him to try to split the Sulaimaniya governorate from the rest of Kurdistan.
It is not the first time Goran is facing this kind of declaration. At the end of november, at a conference with the directors of the PUK newspapers and TV stations, Jalal Talabani instructed them to increase the attacks against Goran and to undermine its own press machine. Heinous articles are published in the PUK press, sometimes on an everyday basis, in which Goran is described as a nest of conspirators and traitors to the party.
But this time, to illustrate Jalal Talabani's declaration, the Goran party office of MP Siwail Osman Ahmed in Koya has been destroyed by an arson attack perpetrated by unknown men the 30/12/2009 in the evening.
The 01/01/2010, in Kurd nuce, PUK's official newspaper, Jalal Talabani gave an interview as leader of the party. He condemned the attack in Koya and promised he would order the asayish to solve the affair, so tacitly admitting the asayish are a force controlled by the PUK.
The harassment, beatings, and recently murder, against Goran can be seen as PUK's electoral campaign. The Iraqi national elections, to be held in march, will be a fight for survival for the PUK. The party must fight to keep control of its territory in Sulaimaniya governorate, where Goran emerged as a force able to defy its - until now - absolute power. But the PUK must as well face the ambitions of its partner in the Kurdistan's regional government, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who could seize the opportunity of the PUK-Goran fight to expand its power at the expenses of its ally.
The PUK is so in danger.
The riots where the residents of Piramagrun took control of the town for the day the 23/12/2009 illustrate the exasperation of the population about the derelict infrastructures, added to the rampant corruption of the PUK and its totalitarist rule. The claims made by the PUK that Goran organised the unrest were dismissed by the demonstrators themselves.
Nonetheless, Goran's popularity can only grow from this kind of events, and the PUK leadership is perfectly aware of it. The war against the traitors will so intensify.
For it is what Jalal Talabani offered to the opposition as new year wishes: a declaration of war.
jeudi 31 décembre 2009
dimanche 27 décembre 2009
Anger spreads turmoil and riots in Kurdistan
Halabja, in the south of the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, is an impoverished town still bearing the marks of the chemical attack carried out by Saddam Hussein's air force the 16/03/1988. It is there that in 2006, street protests against the misrule of ruling party Patriotic Union of Kurdistan culminated in the burning of the monument offered to the town by the PUK leader Jalal Talabani. Since, there is a heavy security presence in the town. The Asayish, the militarised force of the internal security directorate, are everywhere, in front of every official building or administrative service, reflecting the authorities' fear of a re-edition of the 2006 riots.
But despite this heavy security presence it is there that Rauf Zarayani, a former peshmerga who fought against Saddam Hussein, was assassinated in broad daylight.
It was around 16:00 the 25/12/2009 when a white BMW stopped in front of his house and that a man get out with a handgun. Rauf Zarayani didn't lose the reflex acquired during his years of struggle: some witnesses alleged he seized his own handgun and tried to fire at his aggressor. But the weapon misfired and the killer shot Rauf Zarayani four times, killing him.
At his funerals, the day after, were present some prominent figures of the Goran opposition movement including general mam Rostam, who knew the victim from the war against Saddam Hussein.
For Rauf Zarayani was himself a Goran activist, and people say it is the reason for his murder.
Goran is a movement created by Nerchirvan Mustapha, formerly PUK's n*2. The formation recruits mainly amongst PUK members dissatisfied with the party's corruption, and its reformist agenda made it hugely popular amongst the population. Its unexpected good results during the july 2009 provincial elections made it target number one for the PUK leadership, afraid to lose its grip on his fiefdom of Sulaimaniya governorate. In the months following the elections, there has been beatings, and even a botched abduction attempt, against Goran members or journalists critical of the PUK.
In this context, the responsibility for Rauf Zarayani's murder has been attributed to the PUK. A police source said that a witness was able to write the registration number of the killers' vehicle and to transmit it to Halabja's police. From this clue, a suspect was identified in Kirkuk, a town outside the autonomous Kurdistan jurisdiction but claimed by the Kurds, where the PUK is very influential. But, still accordingly to this police source, the alleged gunman couldn't be arrested, for there wasn't any evidence to produce against him. He was so let free. It is widely believed this man is actually a member of a PUK secret services - the Dezgay Zanyari - assassination squad.
And there is ground to give to this rumour. Kurdmedia.net, a London based information website, reported on the 18/11/2009 that the PUK asayish established a section, the "Lijney Mutabaa", to harass political dissidents. A Goran member, Dara Tofiq Agha, was himself attacked in early november with metal bars. Anonymous sources from inside the asayish assert that the perpetrators were members of the anti-terrorist team, originally trained by the americans, which is under the direct orders of Bavel Talabani, mam Jalal's son.
These kind of attacks appear to have increased recently, reflecting the present anxiety of the PUK leadership about the coming Iraqi national elections, perceived as decisive inside Kurdistan and likely to seal the fate of the PUK.
In the same time, at Piramagrun, one of those towns established along Kurdistan's roads to harbour the Kurds chased from their mountain villages by Saddam Hussein's troops and where they were conveniently maintained at the mercy of any retaliation raid by the Iraqi army, saw its residents take to the street in defiance of the PUK authority. It was the worst unrest in the Kurdistan region since the Halabja demonstrations in 2006 and, in a striking parallel, were motivated by the poor amenities and the lack of services.
A KNN TV report made in november was showing the poor conditions in the township, so when the PUK appointed mayor Awat Tofiq (no relation to Dara Tofiq Agha) recently said during a TV interview that Piramagrun people were "blind" and were unaware of the progresses made in the town, outrage spread amongst inhabitants.
The day after, 23/12/2009, a crowd gathered in front of the municipality building, demanding the mayor and his team's resignation and that they leave the town. Some officials were beaten, and then the demonstrators set a roadblock on the artery Sulaimaniya-Duhkan. Some police reinforcement called from Sulaimaniya fired in the air to disperse the demonstrators, but had to withdraw while the rioters set two police vehicles on fire.
In the evening, asayish and peshmergas seized control of the town, amongst fear that they would conduct house-to-house search under the cover of the night. The outcome of the riots left dozens of injured and official buidings vandalised. Two asayish working at Sulaimaniya who were off duty and took part to the unrest were arrested. Some protesters went to hide in mountain villages by fear of being arrested too, and in the mosques, the mollahs condemned in advance any arrest the police would make.
But nothing happened. Once they were sure the protests wouldn't resume, the asayish and the troops withdrew, and the situation came back to normality: derelict infrastructure, supply shortage, and a PUK-appointed mayor, as a replacement to the previous one. From the outside, it looks as if nothing happened. The township remains as neglected as before, and the residents are under the rule of an official they didn't elect.
But dissatisfaction is growing. In Said Sadeq, a town outside Halabja suffering the same kind of problems that in Piramagrun, 100 plots of land were given to PUK members in Mosul. The population, angry to see their assets given to party henchmen, decided to organise a protest. But the demonstration, supposed to take place on the 29, was cancelled on the orders of the asayish. During the night before some troop movements were observed to protect the residence of Jalal Talabani outside Sulaimaniya.
There is so a fear amongst the PUK leadership to see the riots amplify as larger protests, and ultimately lead to the Patriotic Union's hold on Kurdistan to be broken. A scenario similar to the contestation in former Soviet Union republics, with a regime change like in Georgia or Ukrain, becomes more and more of a possibility.
As a result, one can expect the Patriotic Union to rely more and more heavily on the security forces to keep its control on Kurdistan.
But despite this heavy security presence it is there that Rauf Zarayani, a former peshmerga who fought against Saddam Hussein, was assassinated in broad daylight.
It was around 16:00 the 25/12/2009 when a white BMW stopped in front of his house and that a man get out with a handgun. Rauf Zarayani didn't lose the reflex acquired during his years of struggle: some witnesses alleged he seized his own handgun and tried to fire at his aggressor. But the weapon misfired and the killer shot Rauf Zarayani four times, killing him.
At his funerals, the day after, were present some prominent figures of the Goran opposition movement including general mam Rostam, who knew the victim from the war against Saddam Hussein.
For Rauf Zarayani was himself a Goran activist, and people say it is the reason for his murder.
Goran is a movement created by Nerchirvan Mustapha, formerly PUK's n*2. The formation recruits mainly amongst PUK members dissatisfied with the party's corruption, and its reformist agenda made it hugely popular amongst the population. Its unexpected good results during the july 2009 provincial elections made it target number one for the PUK leadership, afraid to lose its grip on his fiefdom of Sulaimaniya governorate. In the months following the elections, there has been beatings, and even a botched abduction attempt, against Goran members or journalists critical of the PUK.
In this context, the responsibility for Rauf Zarayani's murder has been attributed to the PUK. A police source said that a witness was able to write the registration number of the killers' vehicle and to transmit it to Halabja's police. From this clue, a suspect was identified in Kirkuk, a town outside the autonomous Kurdistan jurisdiction but claimed by the Kurds, where the PUK is very influential. But, still accordingly to this police source, the alleged gunman couldn't be arrested, for there wasn't any evidence to produce against him. He was so let free. It is widely believed this man is actually a member of a PUK secret services - the Dezgay Zanyari - assassination squad.
And there is ground to give to this rumour. Kurdmedia.net, a London based information website, reported on the 18/11/2009 that the PUK asayish established a section, the "Lijney Mutabaa", to harass political dissidents. A Goran member, Dara Tofiq Agha, was himself attacked in early november with metal bars. Anonymous sources from inside the asayish assert that the perpetrators were members of the anti-terrorist team, originally trained by the americans, which is under the direct orders of Bavel Talabani, mam Jalal's son.
These kind of attacks appear to have increased recently, reflecting the present anxiety of the PUK leadership about the coming Iraqi national elections, perceived as decisive inside Kurdistan and likely to seal the fate of the PUK.
In the same time, at Piramagrun, one of those towns established along Kurdistan's roads to harbour the Kurds chased from their mountain villages by Saddam Hussein's troops and where they were conveniently maintained at the mercy of any retaliation raid by the Iraqi army, saw its residents take to the street in defiance of the PUK authority. It was the worst unrest in the Kurdistan region since the Halabja demonstrations in 2006 and, in a striking parallel, were motivated by the poor amenities and the lack of services.
A KNN TV report made in november was showing the poor conditions in the township, so when the PUK appointed mayor Awat Tofiq (no relation to Dara Tofiq Agha) recently said during a TV interview that Piramagrun people were "blind" and were unaware of the progresses made in the town, outrage spread amongst inhabitants.
The day after, 23/12/2009, a crowd gathered in front of the municipality building, demanding the mayor and his team's resignation and that they leave the town. Some officials were beaten, and then the demonstrators set a roadblock on the artery Sulaimaniya-Duhkan. Some police reinforcement called from Sulaimaniya fired in the air to disperse the demonstrators, but had to withdraw while the rioters set two police vehicles on fire.
In the evening, asayish and peshmergas seized control of the town, amongst fear that they would conduct house-to-house search under the cover of the night. The outcome of the riots left dozens of injured and official buidings vandalised. Two asayish working at Sulaimaniya who were off duty and took part to the unrest were arrested. Some protesters went to hide in mountain villages by fear of being arrested too, and in the mosques, the mollahs condemned in advance any arrest the police would make.
But nothing happened. Once they were sure the protests wouldn't resume, the asayish and the troops withdrew, and the situation came back to normality: derelict infrastructure, supply shortage, and a PUK-appointed mayor, as a replacement to the previous one. From the outside, it looks as if nothing happened. The township remains as neglected as before, and the residents are under the rule of an official they didn't elect.
But dissatisfaction is growing. In Said Sadeq, a town outside Halabja suffering the same kind of problems that in Piramagrun, 100 plots of land were given to PUK members in Mosul. The population, angry to see their assets given to party henchmen, decided to organise a protest. But the demonstration, supposed to take place on the 29, was cancelled on the orders of the asayish. During the night before some troop movements were observed to protect the residence of Jalal Talabani outside Sulaimaniya.
There is so a fear amongst the PUK leadership to see the riots amplify as larger protests, and ultimately lead to the Patriotic Union's hold on Kurdistan to be broken. A scenario similar to the contestation in former Soviet Union republics, with a regime change like in Georgia or Ukrain, becomes more and more of a possibility.
As a result, one can expect the Patriotic Union to rely more and more heavily on the security forces to keep its control on Kurdistan.
lundi 14 décembre 2009
The water issue: a strategic weapon against the Kurds?
In antiquity, Iraq was known as Mesopotamia, "between the two rivers", understand the Tigris and the Euphrates. It says how important are those two rivers to the country. But during the summer, their water level reached a critical low, to the point that the Iraqi ministries of water resources and of agriculture qualified the situation as disastrous.
The southern provinces were then facing an unprecedented crisis. Due to lack of drinkable water, the cattle started to die and several villages had to be evacuated. The situation was particularly dire in the south's marshlands, home to the marsh arabs. The water level there was at only 20% of its original level. At the end of august the ministry of water resources was saying that 300000 of the marsh arabs had to leave their dwellings and resettle in nearby towns, straining their already scarce resources.
The pumps of the power stations could not reach the water any more, meaning that the electricity supply was disrupted. The impact was severe on an industry already crippled by years of violence. Nasiriyah, Iraq's fourth largest city, was facing the perspective of a blackout.
But more important were the consequences for agriculture, relying heavily on irrigation. Large swathes of once fertile farmlands are drying and turning into desert. The agriculture ministry was saying that only 40 to 50% of the land devoted to culture could be used. As a result Iraq can't meet the needs of its population and has to import most of its food. Another effect is an increased dependency on the oil-related economy, already around 85% of Iraq's income, making the country highly vulnerable to a crisis.
The causes of this disaster were the poor rainfall of the past years, and the building of dams upstream by the neighbouring countries. On the Euphrates alone, Turkey built five dams, Syria two. Negotiations were held, with mixed results, to have Iran, Turkey and Syria releasing higher volumes of water. But it remains that Iraq's water supply is decided by foreign powers, all of them involved in Iraq's internal politics. Would they feel the need of it, they can actually dry the country.
Kurdistan appeared, at first, to have been spared Iraq's water crisis. Its highlands benefit from more important rainfalls than the rest of Iraq, preserving it from drought. And could the province become Iraq's breadbasket, it would help it in its difficult relations with the central government.
But recently the Kurdistan Regional Government's water resources ministry announced it would carry a common study with Iraq's water resources ministry and the United Nations on drought in Makhmur and Karmayan districts, where water level fell at 60% of its original level.
Will Kurdistan face the same fate than central and southern Iraq?
Of great concern as well is the building in Turkey of a dam at Ilisu. Once the dam will be completed, it will affect Kurdistan water supply. Has this problem been addressed when a Turk delegation made an historical visit in Erbil, Kurdistan's capital, in november? Trade with Turkey represents around 60% of Kurdistan's commercial relations. Petrol exports are going by Turkey as well.
This dam will make the KRG even more dependent from Ankara, which is pursuing its own agenda in Iraq and is cleverly using the antagonism between Kurdistan and the central government. The Turks can ask everything they want from the Kurds: for them to give up their claims on Kirkuk, for them to collaborate against the PKK,... landlocked and isolated, the autonomous Kurdistan won't be in a position to refuse them anything.
And, more, the autonomous Kurdistan may find itself caught in a crossfire would the water dispute between Iraq on one side, and Iran, Turkey and Syria on the other side worsen. In a press conference held the 08/12/2009, the Iraqi government threatened to sever economic ties with Iran and Turkey if they were not showing more cooperation on the water issue.
It is an indirect, but clear menace, against Kurdistan. The province lies on the border with these two countries and survives with the trade made with them. Any fracture of the links between Iraq and its powerful neighbours would suffocate Kurdistan in no time.
A way to make the Kurds aware of their vulnerability ahead of the coming Iraqi national elections, in which some factions are seeing the opportunity, at term, to dispose of the Kurdish demands for a federal state.
Sources = "As Iraq runs dry a plague of snakes is unleashed", P. Cockburn, The Independent 15/06/2009
"Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq", M. Chulov, The Guardian 26/08/2009
The southern provinces were then facing an unprecedented crisis. Due to lack of drinkable water, the cattle started to die and several villages had to be evacuated. The situation was particularly dire in the south's marshlands, home to the marsh arabs. The water level there was at only 20% of its original level. At the end of august the ministry of water resources was saying that 300000 of the marsh arabs had to leave their dwellings and resettle in nearby towns, straining their already scarce resources.
The pumps of the power stations could not reach the water any more, meaning that the electricity supply was disrupted. The impact was severe on an industry already crippled by years of violence. Nasiriyah, Iraq's fourth largest city, was facing the perspective of a blackout.
But more important were the consequences for agriculture, relying heavily on irrigation. Large swathes of once fertile farmlands are drying and turning into desert. The agriculture ministry was saying that only 40 to 50% of the land devoted to culture could be used. As a result Iraq can't meet the needs of its population and has to import most of its food. Another effect is an increased dependency on the oil-related economy, already around 85% of Iraq's income, making the country highly vulnerable to a crisis.
The causes of this disaster were the poor rainfall of the past years, and the building of dams upstream by the neighbouring countries. On the Euphrates alone, Turkey built five dams, Syria two. Negotiations were held, with mixed results, to have Iran, Turkey and Syria releasing higher volumes of water. But it remains that Iraq's water supply is decided by foreign powers, all of them involved in Iraq's internal politics. Would they feel the need of it, they can actually dry the country.
Kurdistan appeared, at first, to have been spared Iraq's water crisis. Its highlands benefit from more important rainfalls than the rest of Iraq, preserving it from drought. And could the province become Iraq's breadbasket, it would help it in its difficult relations with the central government.
But recently the Kurdistan Regional Government's water resources ministry announced it would carry a common study with Iraq's water resources ministry and the United Nations on drought in Makhmur and Karmayan districts, where water level fell at 60% of its original level.
Will Kurdistan face the same fate than central and southern Iraq?
Of great concern as well is the building in Turkey of a dam at Ilisu. Once the dam will be completed, it will affect Kurdistan water supply. Has this problem been addressed when a Turk delegation made an historical visit in Erbil, Kurdistan's capital, in november? Trade with Turkey represents around 60% of Kurdistan's commercial relations. Petrol exports are going by Turkey as well.
This dam will make the KRG even more dependent from Ankara, which is pursuing its own agenda in Iraq and is cleverly using the antagonism between Kurdistan and the central government. The Turks can ask everything they want from the Kurds: for them to give up their claims on Kirkuk, for them to collaborate against the PKK,... landlocked and isolated, the autonomous Kurdistan won't be in a position to refuse them anything.
And, more, the autonomous Kurdistan may find itself caught in a crossfire would the water dispute between Iraq on one side, and Iran, Turkey and Syria on the other side worsen. In a press conference held the 08/12/2009, the Iraqi government threatened to sever economic ties with Iran and Turkey if they were not showing more cooperation on the water issue.
It is an indirect, but clear menace, against Kurdistan. The province lies on the border with these two countries and survives with the trade made with them. Any fracture of the links between Iraq and its powerful neighbours would suffocate Kurdistan in no time.
A way to make the Kurds aware of their vulnerability ahead of the coming Iraqi national elections, in which some factions are seeing the opportunity, at term, to dispose of the Kurdish demands for a federal state.
Sources = "As Iraq runs dry a plague of snakes is unleashed", P. Cockburn, The Independent 15/06/2009
"Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq", M. Chulov, The Guardian 26/08/2009
lundi 7 décembre 2009
The electoral law: a step backward for the Kurds.
The electoral law for Iraq's national elections has been voted - at last! Immediately the UN and the USA expressed their satisfaction, and so did the different protagonists involved in the endless dispute around the text.
There is, nonetheless, nothing to rejoice about. The text was voted unanimously, it is true, but there was only 138 parliamentarians on the 275 the Baghdad assembly actually has, 138 being the minimum required by the constitution for a parliamentary session to be held. It took the whole sunday and last minute phone calls from Barack Obama and Joe Biden to muster this number, and have the law passed at 23:50, ten minutes before the ultimate deadline.
The law could be passed because the Kurd representatives, who were contesting the number of seats allocated to the autonomous Kurdistan province, were pressured into voting it by the US officials. Shaho Saed, a member of the Goran opposition movement present during the negotiations held by the Americans, reports the threats made to sideline Kurdistan would the troublesome Kurds not comply to the American agenda, which has been the main preoccupation of the electoral law issue.
As a result, Kurdistan finds itself with a diminished representation in the assembly to come. On 325 seats, they will have 41. It will dilute significantly their influence in Baghdad, and makes the implementation of the article 140 even less likely than in the past.
At the heart of the tenses between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government are lying the disputed territories, including Kirkuk. Those are areas claimed by the Kurds, but outside their boundaries. An article of the Iraqi constitution, the article 140, states that a census, followed by a referendum, will determine the fate of the territories.
The census was to be carried at the end of 2007. But until now, the Iraqi government reported it, effectively prolonging a status quo in which Kirkuk and its crucial petrol resources were kept away from the Kurds.
During the january 2009 provincial elections, Iraq prime minister Nouri al-Maliki made no secret of his plans to modify the Iraqi constitution. He favours a strong central state, as opposed to the project of a federal state the Kurds wanted.
In agreeing to a reduced number of parliamentarians in the national assembly, the Kurd representatives may have given up the claims on Kirkuk. The real autonomy the control of the town could have given to Kurdistan is now compromised. Effectively, the province will remain dependent to Baghdad.
The Kurdistan Alliance, the coalition of the two parties sharing power in Kurdistan, the PUK and the KDP, were at pain to present the electoral law as a step forward, while the opposition in Kurdistan denounced it as a capitulation.
In an official statement released just after the electoral law was passed, the USA are asserting their support to a census taking place in 2010, and to the article 140. But, in the same text, they mention as well the article 142, allowing to amend the constitution. It doesn't augur well for the Kurdish claims, especially when the Iraqi vice-president Tareq al-Hashimi, who originally vetoed the law on the behalf of the Sunni arab faction, talk about is satisfaction to have gained concessions and says the task is now to reinforce "unity".
Kemal Kerkuki, Kurdistan's regional assembly speaker, and Kosrat Rasul, the KRG vice-president, were tuesday and wednesday in Baghdad engaged in a succession of meetings, trying to secure guarantees and alliances. Kosrat Rasul spoke on PUKmedia.net, the PUK mouthpiece, of the necessity to build a front with other non-Kurd parties, as during the Saddam Hussein years. A reference to the "unity" praised by Tareq al-Hashimi? The Iraqi vice-president represents the Sunnis, who lost their privileges after the dictator's fall. He wants the de-baathication policy to be halted, if not reversed, asserting it harms principally the Sunnis and bars them to hold a significant position in the new Iraq.
The Kurd leaders now under double pressure. They have to face some national elections promising them a reduced representation at the national assembly, and the discontent of their people, who feel their delegates surrendered their demands.
There is, nonetheless, nothing to rejoice about. The text was voted unanimously, it is true, but there was only 138 parliamentarians on the 275 the Baghdad assembly actually has, 138 being the minimum required by the constitution for a parliamentary session to be held. It took the whole sunday and last minute phone calls from Barack Obama and Joe Biden to muster this number, and have the law passed at 23:50, ten minutes before the ultimate deadline.
The law could be passed because the Kurd representatives, who were contesting the number of seats allocated to the autonomous Kurdistan province, were pressured into voting it by the US officials. Shaho Saed, a member of the Goran opposition movement present during the negotiations held by the Americans, reports the threats made to sideline Kurdistan would the troublesome Kurds not comply to the American agenda, which has been the main preoccupation of the electoral law issue.
As a result, Kurdistan finds itself with a diminished representation in the assembly to come. On 325 seats, they will have 41. It will dilute significantly their influence in Baghdad, and makes the implementation of the article 140 even less likely than in the past.
At the heart of the tenses between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government are lying the disputed territories, including Kirkuk. Those are areas claimed by the Kurds, but outside their boundaries. An article of the Iraqi constitution, the article 140, states that a census, followed by a referendum, will determine the fate of the territories.
The census was to be carried at the end of 2007. But until now, the Iraqi government reported it, effectively prolonging a status quo in which Kirkuk and its crucial petrol resources were kept away from the Kurds.
During the january 2009 provincial elections, Iraq prime minister Nouri al-Maliki made no secret of his plans to modify the Iraqi constitution. He favours a strong central state, as opposed to the project of a federal state the Kurds wanted.
In agreeing to a reduced number of parliamentarians in the national assembly, the Kurd representatives may have given up the claims on Kirkuk. The real autonomy the control of the town could have given to Kurdistan is now compromised. Effectively, the province will remain dependent to Baghdad.
The Kurdistan Alliance, the coalition of the two parties sharing power in Kurdistan, the PUK and the KDP, were at pain to present the electoral law as a step forward, while the opposition in Kurdistan denounced it as a capitulation.
In an official statement released just after the electoral law was passed, the USA are asserting their support to a census taking place in 2010, and to the article 140. But, in the same text, they mention as well the article 142, allowing to amend the constitution. It doesn't augur well for the Kurdish claims, especially when the Iraqi vice-president Tareq al-Hashimi, who originally vetoed the law on the behalf of the Sunni arab faction, talk about is satisfaction to have gained concessions and says the task is now to reinforce "unity".
Kemal Kerkuki, Kurdistan's regional assembly speaker, and Kosrat Rasul, the KRG vice-president, were tuesday and wednesday in Baghdad engaged in a succession of meetings, trying to secure guarantees and alliances. Kosrat Rasul spoke on PUKmedia.net, the PUK mouthpiece, of the necessity to build a front with other non-Kurd parties, as during the Saddam Hussein years. A reference to the "unity" praised by Tareq al-Hashimi? The Iraqi vice-president represents the Sunnis, who lost their privileges after the dictator's fall. He wants the de-baathication policy to be halted, if not reversed, asserting it harms principally the Sunnis and bars them to hold a significant position in the new Iraq.
The Kurd leaders now under double pressure. They have to face some national elections promising them a reduced representation at the national assembly, and the discontent of their people, who feel their delegates surrendered their demands.
samedi 5 décembre 2009
The Kirkuk impasse
The electoral law for the Iraqi national elections has still to be approved. A first version, presented to the Baghdad parliament after weeks of difficult negotiations between Iraqi lawmakers, was adopted after heavy pressure from both the US and the UN. It was immediately rejected by the Sunni vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi, on the grounds that the law was not giving a proper representation to the refugees, mainly Sunnis, who fled Iraq for fear of sectarian violence and are now living in neighbouring countries. The system of allocation of seats was contested by the Kurds as well, and a second version of the law was drafted, in which some seats, initially attributed to the Sunnis, are given to the Kurds.
The Arab Sunni politicians didn't attend the vote at the Baghdad parliament as a form of protest. To avoid another veto by Tariq al-Hashimi, further negotiations were held, destined to bring the different sides to a compromise.
But, to date, nothing emerged.
The opposite factions appear to adopt an attitude of no concessions, effectively paralysing the process. When he received the UN special envoy in Erbil yesterday, the president of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said that the Kurds would not accept the present system of seats allocation, which is reducing their representation in Baghdad. If the present system was maintained, he added, the Kurds would so ask for a census to be held, to have a definitive image of the Iraqi population, and so be able to give representation accordingly to reliable datas.
This statement is a barely veiled threat on Iraq's stability.
The Iraqi government carefully avoids to hold any census. It has the potential to sparkle a new round of sectarian cleansing. The risks are to see the different factions bringing people in the contested areas to shift the demographic advantage in their favour. It would go, of course, with a campaign of intimidations, if not of violences, to push away residents from other communities.
At the heart of the problem is the city of Kirkuk, originally the reason of the endless wrangling which delayed the drafting of the electoral law.
The city lies on the fringes of the autonomous Kurdistan and is claimed by the Kurds as theirs. They ask for a census to be held to determine if Kirkuk must remain under the control of the central government or if it must be included in the Kurdistan region.
The Iraqi constitution states that the issue of the contested territories, including Kirkuk, will be solved by such a way. But the central governments refuses to implement it. After the 2003 American invasion, the Kurds came massively in the oil-rich city, and any census would give them a clear majority. A return of Kirkuk under the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government means an important step towards their dream of an independent Kurdish state. For the central government, it would mean the loss of a strategic asset, and of a significant loss of income. At term, possibly even the fracture of the state.
Massoud Barzani is not the only one to bring the problem of the electoral law back to Kirkuk. In an interview given the 24/11/2009 Jawar Namiq, former speaker of the Kurdistan region parliament, declared that the Kurd lawmakers in Baghdad should never have approved the amended version of the electoral law, that the actual issue was Kirkuk and the way it was addressed in the law, which states that while the vote would be held, a special disposition would have the results open to negotiation during one year.
The Kurd politician Mahmoud Othman, member of the Iraqi national assembly, says that an election relying on an inaccurate system of seats repartition would have no credibility. It would be better, he says, to report the polls until a proper census is conducted.
These interventions are following efforts from the Kurdistan Regional Government to reinforce the links between the province and Kirkuk. Kurdistan's prime minister Bahram Salih went the 24/11/2009 in the town to deliver a message of support, in which he reasserted the determination of the KRG to resolve any issue accordingly to the constitution. And this despite any external interference - a clear reference to the UN attempts to bring the Kurds to accept a special status for Kirkuk. He called as well for an improved coordination between the KRG and the Kirkuk's administration.
The same day was announced a project to build a railroad between Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. A way to bring the contested town closer to Kurdistan.
These moves are provoking bitter opposition from the Arabs and Turkmens from Kirkuk, who fear to be marginalised and are worrying about the Kurds nationalist claims. Yesterday, the Arab parties called vice president al-Hashimi to reject the electoral law if the present version was not amended, and said they would boycott the polls unless some guarantees were given to the minorities and a special status given to Kirkuk. One of them, Sheikh Abdullah Sami al-Hassi, said that they would even take to the streets to oppose the law.
This worrying statement mirrors the one made by a leader of al-Sawha, former Sunni insurgents turned pro-governmental militias, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, who accused the Kurds of stealing Kirkuk.
The situation is so in a dangerous impasse. Today, the Sunni parliamentarians didn't attend the assembly, meaning there wasn't enough representatives to hold a session. As a result, the contentious electoral law can't even be discussed.
The Arab Sunni politicians didn't attend the vote at the Baghdad parliament as a form of protest. To avoid another veto by Tariq al-Hashimi, further negotiations were held, destined to bring the different sides to a compromise.
But, to date, nothing emerged.
The opposite factions appear to adopt an attitude of no concessions, effectively paralysing the process. When he received the UN special envoy in Erbil yesterday, the president of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said that the Kurds would not accept the present system of seats allocation, which is reducing their representation in Baghdad. If the present system was maintained, he added, the Kurds would so ask for a census to be held, to have a definitive image of the Iraqi population, and so be able to give representation accordingly to reliable datas.
This statement is a barely veiled threat on Iraq's stability.
The Iraqi government carefully avoids to hold any census. It has the potential to sparkle a new round of sectarian cleansing. The risks are to see the different factions bringing people in the contested areas to shift the demographic advantage in their favour. It would go, of course, with a campaign of intimidations, if not of violences, to push away residents from other communities.
At the heart of the problem is the city of Kirkuk, originally the reason of the endless wrangling which delayed the drafting of the electoral law.
The city lies on the fringes of the autonomous Kurdistan and is claimed by the Kurds as theirs. They ask for a census to be held to determine if Kirkuk must remain under the control of the central government or if it must be included in the Kurdistan region.
The Iraqi constitution states that the issue of the contested territories, including Kirkuk, will be solved by such a way. But the central governments refuses to implement it. After the 2003 American invasion, the Kurds came massively in the oil-rich city, and any census would give them a clear majority. A return of Kirkuk under the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government means an important step towards their dream of an independent Kurdish state. For the central government, it would mean the loss of a strategic asset, and of a significant loss of income. At term, possibly even the fracture of the state.
Massoud Barzani is not the only one to bring the problem of the electoral law back to Kirkuk. In an interview given the 24/11/2009 Jawar Namiq, former speaker of the Kurdistan region parliament, declared that the Kurd lawmakers in Baghdad should never have approved the amended version of the electoral law, that the actual issue was Kirkuk and the way it was addressed in the law, which states that while the vote would be held, a special disposition would have the results open to negotiation during one year.
The Kurd politician Mahmoud Othman, member of the Iraqi national assembly, says that an election relying on an inaccurate system of seats repartition would have no credibility. It would be better, he says, to report the polls until a proper census is conducted.
These interventions are following efforts from the Kurdistan Regional Government to reinforce the links between the province and Kirkuk. Kurdistan's prime minister Bahram Salih went the 24/11/2009 in the town to deliver a message of support, in which he reasserted the determination of the KRG to resolve any issue accordingly to the constitution. And this despite any external interference - a clear reference to the UN attempts to bring the Kurds to accept a special status for Kirkuk. He called as well for an improved coordination between the KRG and the Kirkuk's administration.
The same day was announced a project to build a railroad between Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. A way to bring the contested town closer to Kurdistan.
These moves are provoking bitter opposition from the Arabs and Turkmens from Kirkuk, who fear to be marginalised and are worrying about the Kurds nationalist claims. Yesterday, the Arab parties called vice president al-Hashimi to reject the electoral law if the present version was not amended, and said they would boycott the polls unless some guarantees were given to the minorities and a special status given to Kirkuk. One of them, Sheikh Abdullah Sami al-Hassi, said that they would even take to the streets to oppose the law.
This worrying statement mirrors the one made by a leader of al-Sawha, former Sunni insurgents turned pro-governmental militias, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, who accused the Kurds of stealing Kirkuk.
The situation is so in a dangerous impasse. Today, the Sunni parliamentarians didn't attend the assembly, meaning there wasn't enough representatives to hold a session. As a result, the contentious electoral law can't even be discussed.
mercredi 2 décembre 2009
PUK's new war
On the 29/11/09, three men approached the outspoken Kurd journalist Nabaz Goran outside Jihan magazine offices in Erbil. After having made sure of his identity, they physically assaulted him. In a press conference given shortly after, where he was shown with bruises on his face, Nabaz Goran accused the Kurdistan Democratic Party, one of the two parties controlling Kurdistan, to have perpetrated the aggression.
Attacks on opposition activists and journalists critical of the authorities are increasing in Kurdistan. There has been abductions and beatings, even a murder in the past, but they recently stepped up.
For nearly two decades, autonomous Kurdistan has been governed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, who divided the region in two fiefdoms in which they exercice an almost absolute control, and share the power at the Kurdistan Regional Government.
But during the july provincial elections, a new political movement, Goran (nothing to do with Nabaz Goran), made unexpected good results, allowing it to become an alternative force in the Kurdistan parliament.
Jalal Talabani's PUK feels particularly threatened: Goran leadership is actually made of its former influential members who left because their demands for reform were ignored. Their stance against corruption and their call for a more democratic society gave them the support of a population tired of rampant embezzlement amongst the PUK and its autocratic rule.
Its power contested in its own territory, by its own population, the PUK reacted by a purge. 2000 public sector workers, suspected to have supported Goran, lost their job. Following the same principle, Sulaimaniya University's Student Union was reportedly instructed to collect information on its members, the purpose being to detect then root out any Goran sympathiser.
In the same time some highly theatralised mass meetings took place: they were featuring members from Goran, numbering by the hundreds, attending gatherings at some PUK offices where they were collectively abjuring in the presence of a party's senior member and were coming back within the ranks of the PUK. If they were only 100at the beginning of november, their number, and the frequency of the events, increased sharply to reach 500 attendants at Sulaimaniya the 26/11/09 - the fourth event of this kind in just five days. When he came back from Baghdad the 01/12/2009, Jalal Talabani was presented in his stronghold of Qalachoalan, outside Sulaimaniya, with 1000 Goran members returning to the PUK. Some of them are, quite obviously, the former public service members who lost their job after having voted Goran in july, and who were said they would have their job again if they were coming back to the PUK. It is equally said that some of the participants are attending several of the events, or that administration workers are detailed to inflate numbers.
The strange spectacle of people marching to a compound as if they were surrendering led to Shaho Saed, a Goran representative, to compare them to prisoners who have been captured.
For it really looks the PUK considers itself at war.
Born during the liberation battles against Saddam Hussein's oppression, PUK revealed itself to be an efficient war machine, but didn't perform as well in peace. Faced by its defeat in the july polls, and with the crucial national elections coming, the party reversed in the situation which was the more familiar to it: by declaring an all-out war.
Beside the mass gatherings and the relentless campaign against Goran in the PUK press - Jalal Talabani, during a meeting with the PUK press directors past week, is said to have instructed them to intensify the attacks - the beatings, abductions and else appear to be another aspect of this war.
Nabaz Goran hasn't been the only one to sustain an attack in the wake of the july PUK defeat. In september, Kak Soran, a Norwegian People's Aid worker who spoke out against corruption, was abducted and detained during three days by some unknown aggressors, during which he was drugged and beaten. Dara Tofiq Agah, a Goran activist, was attacked with metal bars in broad daylight in Sulaimaniya while the 11/11/09 the editor of Wirdbeen magazine was shot at - and missed. Another journalist, Ahmed Mira, editor of Levin magazine, survived a botched attempt of abduction which could have resulted by his death.
These attacks are said to be carried by a section of the PUK Asayish (internal security services), dedicated to the harassment of dissidents.
The increased cooperation between the KDP and the PUK is, in this context, a worrying development. Previously, a person targeted in the KDP held Erbil would have been relatively safe in PUK's Sulaimaniya. But now, the support the KDP is bringing to Jalal talabani's party, its partner in the Kurdistan Regional Government, means a more efficient repression.
Nabaz Goran, now living and working in Sulaimaniya, says anything can expected. The attacks, he says, will increase. And so thinks Ahmed Mira, whose yesterday's Levin issue publishes a lashing condemnation of Jalal Talabani. Some people are predicting he will become the next victim of PUK's war.
Attacks on opposition activists and journalists critical of the authorities are increasing in Kurdistan. There has been abductions and beatings, even a murder in the past, but they recently stepped up.
For nearly two decades, autonomous Kurdistan has been governed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, who divided the region in two fiefdoms in which they exercice an almost absolute control, and share the power at the Kurdistan Regional Government.
But during the july provincial elections, a new political movement, Goran (nothing to do with Nabaz Goran), made unexpected good results, allowing it to become an alternative force in the Kurdistan parliament.
Jalal Talabani's PUK feels particularly threatened: Goran leadership is actually made of its former influential members who left because their demands for reform were ignored. Their stance against corruption and their call for a more democratic society gave them the support of a population tired of rampant embezzlement amongst the PUK and its autocratic rule.
Its power contested in its own territory, by its own population, the PUK reacted by a purge. 2000 public sector workers, suspected to have supported Goran, lost their job. Following the same principle, Sulaimaniya University's Student Union was reportedly instructed to collect information on its members, the purpose being to detect then root out any Goran sympathiser.
In the same time some highly theatralised mass meetings took place: they were featuring members from Goran, numbering by the hundreds, attending gatherings at some PUK offices where they were collectively abjuring in the presence of a party's senior member and were coming back within the ranks of the PUK. If they were only 100at the beginning of november, their number, and the frequency of the events, increased sharply to reach 500 attendants at Sulaimaniya the 26/11/09 - the fourth event of this kind in just five days. When he came back from Baghdad the 01/12/2009, Jalal Talabani was presented in his stronghold of Qalachoalan, outside Sulaimaniya, with 1000 Goran members returning to the PUK. Some of them are, quite obviously, the former public service members who lost their job after having voted Goran in july, and who were said they would have their job again if they were coming back to the PUK. It is equally said that some of the participants are attending several of the events, or that administration workers are detailed to inflate numbers.
The strange spectacle of people marching to a compound as if they were surrendering led to Shaho Saed, a Goran representative, to compare them to prisoners who have been captured.
For it really looks the PUK considers itself at war.
Born during the liberation battles against Saddam Hussein's oppression, PUK revealed itself to be an efficient war machine, but didn't perform as well in peace. Faced by its defeat in the july polls, and with the crucial national elections coming, the party reversed in the situation which was the more familiar to it: by declaring an all-out war.
Beside the mass gatherings and the relentless campaign against Goran in the PUK press - Jalal Talabani, during a meeting with the PUK press directors past week, is said to have instructed them to intensify the attacks - the beatings, abductions and else appear to be another aspect of this war.
Nabaz Goran hasn't been the only one to sustain an attack in the wake of the july PUK defeat. In september, Kak Soran, a Norwegian People's Aid worker who spoke out against corruption, was abducted and detained during three days by some unknown aggressors, during which he was drugged and beaten. Dara Tofiq Agah, a Goran activist, was attacked with metal bars in broad daylight in Sulaimaniya while the 11/11/09 the editor of Wirdbeen magazine was shot at - and missed. Another journalist, Ahmed Mira, editor of Levin magazine, survived a botched attempt of abduction which could have resulted by his death.
These attacks are said to be carried by a section of the PUK Asayish (internal security services), dedicated to the harassment of dissidents.
The increased cooperation between the KDP and the PUK is, in this context, a worrying development. Previously, a person targeted in the KDP held Erbil would have been relatively safe in PUK's Sulaimaniya. But now, the support the KDP is bringing to Jalal talabani's party, its partner in the Kurdistan Regional Government, means a more efficient repression.
Nabaz Goran, now living and working in Sulaimaniya, says anything can expected. The attacks, he says, will increase. And so thinks Ahmed Mira, whose yesterday's Levin issue publishes a lashing condemnation of Jalal Talabani. Some people are predicting he will become the next victim of PUK's war.
lundi 30 novembre 2009
Electoral law: the Sunni veto
The electoral law for Iraq's national election has still not yet been approved. As a result the vote, originally scheduled in january, will have to be reported, possibly in mid-march.
The delay is the result of a veto from vice-president al-Hashimi. After weeks of difficult negotiations at the Baghdad parliament, the law was at last drafted, but was immediately contested by the Sunni vice-president. According to him, the refugees, mainly Sunni, living in Jordan and Syria were not given a fair representation in the new parliament.
The Sunni Arabs were the dominating force in Iraq during Saddam Hussein's regime, but lost their power after the 2003 American invasion. They fear to be further marginalised in the new parliament.
A first version of the law was adopted the 08/11/2009. A delicate matter was the repartition of 48 additional seats, supposed to reflect the population growth since the previous 2005 elections. The Nineveh province, where Kurds and Sunnis are competing for control, was to be given 13 new seats, to reach a total of 31. By contrast the total of seats in autonomous Kurdistan would have amounted to 38. The Kurds threatened to boycott the elections if the system of attribution of the new parliamentary seats was not modified, and as a result a second version of the electoral law was voted on the 25/11/2009. In it, the seats previously given to the Sunni Arabs are de facto re-attributed to the Kurds. It caused the Sunni Arab parliamentaries to refuse to attend the vote, and the law was passed with only 152 parliamentaries present on the 275 the assembly has.
The Eid celebration put the dispute on hold, providing a respite used for further negotiations before the Baghdad parliament to re-open.
It remains that the Sunnis appear to be used as a barrage to Kurdish ambitions. The Nineveh province is one of the disputed areas, that the Kurds want to see integrated to their autonomous region. The provincial council there is dominated by al-Hadba, a formation born after the 2005 elections, which gained a lot of support with an anti-Kurdish agenda. Resolutely nationalist, it supports a strong central state and so would have been very useful to oppose the project of a federal state the Kurds want to push forward, would have the number of representatives the electoral law was originally giving Nineveh been approved. Its leadership includes several Iraqi army former high-ranking officers linked to the Baath party. Kurdish peshmergas and security forces faithful to the al-Hadba governor are facing each other in the volatile province, a hotbed of insurgents.
Of some concerns as well are the comments of Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, a leader of the al-Sahwa militia. In an apparent reaction to the electoral law passed the 25/11/2009 at Baghdad's assembly, amended to respond to Kurds' demands, he accused them to be the cause of Iraq's nowadays problems. The campaigns waged against them by the successive Iraqi regimes have been caused, he said, by their permanent efforts to undermine Iraq's unity.
Al-Sahwa is a 95000-strong force of Sunnis, most of them former insurgents the Americans turned as pro-governmental militias. 20% are supposed to be, at term, integrated in the security forces, while the others are to be reinserted in the civilian society, but their fate is still uncertain.
Would they be used to oppose Kurdish claims on the disputed areas?
The question can be asked. Sheikh Risha accuses the Kurds of trying to steal Kirkuk, and so once again the problem returns to the disputed city. Kurds were chased from it by Saddam Hussein, who replaced them by Arab settlers. The Kurds came back in the wake of the Americans in 2003 and are now claiming the town as theirs. They demand a census and a referendum to be held, as stated in the constitution, to decide of the town's integration in their autonomous region. They face strong opposition from Arabs and Turkmens, who are denouncing the mass return of Kurd refugees in Kirkuk as an attempt to make it a Kurd colony.
In this perspective the Sunnis are becoming valuable auxiliaries for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who refuses to let Kirkuk escape the control of the Baghdad government and made no mystery of his plans to change the constitution and establish a strong central state.
Anyway the electoral law issue is not solved yet. Tariq al-Hashimi may use his veto once again. Wranglings have been going during all the Eid period; they include interventions from the USA and the United Nations, who are pressing the different sides to reach an agreement. Joe Biden, the american vice-president, spent the weekend phoning the key protagonists, showing how important were the elections for the USA. It led Ammar al-Hakim, head of the powerful Shia Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, to warn yesterday against any foreign interference into the political process. The consensus, he said, had to be made for the benefit of the Iraqi people, not to comply to the agenda of a foreign power.
The delay is the result of a veto from vice-president al-Hashimi. After weeks of difficult negotiations at the Baghdad parliament, the law was at last drafted, but was immediately contested by the Sunni vice-president. According to him, the refugees, mainly Sunni, living in Jordan and Syria were not given a fair representation in the new parliament.
The Sunni Arabs were the dominating force in Iraq during Saddam Hussein's regime, but lost their power after the 2003 American invasion. They fear to be further marginalised in the new parliament.
A first version of the law was adopted the 08/11/2009. A delicate matter was the repartition of 48 additional seats, supposed to reflect the population growth since the previous 2005 elections. The Nineveh province, where Kurds and Sunnis are competing for control, was to be given 13 new seats, to reach a total of 31. By contrast the total of seats in autonomous Kurdistan would have amounted to 38. The Kurds threatened to boycott the elections if the system of attribution of the new parliamentary seats was not modified, and as a result a second version of the electoral law was voted on the 25/11/2009. In it, the seats previously given to the Sunni Arabs are de facto re-attributed to the Kurds. It caused the Sunni Arab parliamentaries to refuse to attend the vote, and the law was passed with only 152 parliamentaries present on the 275 the assembly has.
The Eid celebration put the dispute on hold, providing a respite used for further negotiations before the Baghdad parliament to re-open.
It remains that the Sunnis appear to be used as a barrage to Kurdish ambitions. The Nineveh province is one of the disputed areas, that the Kurds want to see integrated to their autonomous region. The provincial council there is dominated by al-Hadba, a formation born after the 2005 elections, which gained a lot of support with an anti-Kurdish agenda. Resolutely nationalist, it supports a strong central state and so would have been very useful to oppose the project of a federal state the Kurds want to push forward, would have the number of representatives the electoral law was originally giving Nineveh been approved. Its leadership includes several Iraqi army former high-ranking officers linked to the Baath party. Kurdish peshmergas and security forces faithful to the al-Hadba governor are facing each other in the volatile province, a hotbed of insurgents.
Of some concerns as well are the comments of Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, a leader of the al-Sahwa militia. In an apparent reaction to the electoral law passed the 25/11/2009 at Baghdad's assembly, amended to respond to Kurds' demands, he accused them to be the cause of Iraq's nowadays problems. The campaigns waged against them by the successive Iraqi regimes have been caused, he said, by their permanent efforts to undermine Iraq's unity.
Al-Sahwa is a 95000-strong force of Sunnis, most of them former insurgents the Americans turned as pro-governmental militias. 20% are supposed to be, at term, integrated in the security forces, while the others are to be reinserted in the civilian society, but their fate is still uncertain.
Would they be used to oppose Kurdish claims on the disputed areas?
The question can be asked. Sheikh Risha accuses the Kurds of trying to steal Kirkuk, and so once again the problem returns to the disputed city. Kurds were chased from it by Saddam Hussein, who replaced them by Arab settlers. The Kurds came back in the wake of the Americans in 2003 and are now claiming the town as theirs. They demand a census and a referendum to be held, as stated in the constitution, to decide of the town's integration in their autonomous region. They face strong opposition from Arabs and Turkmens, who are denouncing the mass return of Kurd refugees in Kirkuk as an attempt to make it a Kurd colony.
In this perspective the Sunnis are becoming valuable auxiliaries for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who refuses to let Kirkuk escape the control of the Baghdad government and made no mystery of his plans to change the constitution and establish a strong central state.
Anyway the electoral law issue is not solved yet. Tariq al-Hashimi may use his veto once again. Wranglings have been going during all the Eid period; they include interventions from the USA and the United Nations, who are pressing the different sides to reach an agreement. Joe Biden, the american vice-president, spent the weekend phoning the key protagonists, showing how important were the elections for the USA. It led Ammar al-Hakim, head of the powerful Shia Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, to warn yesterday against any foreign interference into the political process. The consensus, he said, had to be made for the benefit of the Iraqi people, not to comply to the agenda of a foreign power.
vendredi 27 novembre 2009
Goran members defect to the PUK
"A group of 400 cadres and members of Change List from Koya area announced on november 22, 2009 their stances to return back to the lines of the PUK"
"This came during a mass meeting held in the presence of Bahran Saed Sofi PUK leadership member, the head and administrative staff of PUK organisational centre in Koya in addition to some PUK officials who received the returned cadres" (PUKmedia, 25/11/2009)
"A group of 500 cadres and members of Change List from Sulaimani province announced on november 26 their stances to return back to the lines of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan"
"This came during a meeting held in the presence of Mr Shaho representative of Mam Jalal Talabani and some PUK officials who received the returned cadres" (PUKmedia, 26/11/2009)
These kind of press releases on the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's online information website started to appear several weeks ago.
The Change List, it is Goran, the new opposition party which made surprising gains during the july provincial elections, especially in PUK's Sulaimaniya stronghold. Its leadership is largely coming from a PUK reformist wing, tired of the party's rampant cronyism. For Kurdistan is divided in two fiefdoms, one under control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the other under the one of the PUK, in which those two parties are controlling everything: the administration belongs to them, as well as the exploitation of resources, the distribution of amenities or else. They so allocate posts, decide of the public projects, following the interests of the party - and those of its leaders...
It is in denouncing this situation that Goran attracted the votes of a dissatisfied population. Lifelong PUK supporters casted their votes for Goran, including public sector workers who owed their position to their party affiliation.
As a result, immediately after the elections, close to 2000 of those public sector workers lost their jobs. It didn't prevent, anyway, discontent to grow against the PUK, whose popularity continues to decline. There is a serious risk to see Goran gain even more support in the national elections originally scheduled for january 2010.
Anxious to regain its power, the PUK leadership so staged mass meeting in which Goran members renounce their new loyalty to come back to the Patriotic Union. The frequency of the PUKmedia reports of these defections increases as we come closer to the elections, as well as the number of "cadres", "members" of Goran returning to the party line. If they were only 100 at a meeting held at the beginning of november, they were 200 at Bitwen the 21/11/2009, and 250 the following day at the PUK's Social Affairs offices in Zakho.
Safin Mala Qara, Goran representative in Erbil and himself former senior member in the PUK, explained that a lot of the defectors were people who were expecting Goran to act as the PUK does, and so provide them with posts and advantages. Once they realised Goran would not reproduce the patronage system it denounces, did he explain in an interview with KNN TV, they went back to the PUK.
Amongst those people are as well some of the teachers, police officers, sacked after the july elections for having supported Goran. The PUK recontacted them and promised to give them back their former jobs, provided they would publicly abjure.
To provide always more participants, it is alleged that some of them went to several meetings, and that at one opportunity the personnel from an administrative office were instructed to attend. Is it true?
The theatralisation of those events and their authoritarian nature, reported by PUKmedia in its inimitable Soviet press-like style, led Shaho Saed, a Goran MP at the autonomous Kurdistan assembly, to say that the repentants are treated as war prisoners surrendering.
In a funny parallel, PUKmedia, during the past week reported the events beside the information "President Barzani pardons 250 prisoners"...
"This came during a mass meeting held in the presence of Bahran Saed Sofi PUK leadership member, the head and administrative staff of PUK organisational centre in Koya in addition to some PUK officials who received the returned cadres" (PUKmedia, 25/11/2009)
"A group of 500 cadres and members of Change List from Sulaimani province announced on november 26 their stances to return back to the lines of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan"
"This came during a meeting held in the presence of Mr Shaho representative of Mam Jalal Talabani and some PUK officials who received the returned cadres" (PUKmedia, 26/11/2009)
These kind of press releases on the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's online information website started to appear several weeks ago.
The Change List, it is Goran, the new opposition party which made surprising gains during the july provincial elections, especially in PUK's Sulaimaniya stronghold. Its leadership is largely coming from a PUK reformist wing, tired of the party's rampant cronyism. For Kurdistan is divided in two fiefdoms, one under control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the other under the one of the PUK, in which those two parties are controlling everything: the administration belongs to them, as well as the exploitation of resources, the distribution of amenities or else. They so allocate posts, decide of the public projects, following the interests of the party - and those of its leaders...
It is in denouncing this situation that Goran attracted the votes of a dissatisfied population. Lifelong PUK supporters casted their votes for Goran, including public sector workers who owed their position to their party affiliation.
As a result, immediately after the elections, close to 2000 of those public sector workers lost their jobs. It didn't prevent, anyway, discontent to grow against the PUK, whose popularity continues to decline. There is a serious risk to see Goran gain even more support in the national elections originally scheduled for january 2010.
Anxious to regain its power, the PUK leadership so staged mass meeting in which Goran members renounce their new loyalty to come back to the Patriotic Union. The frequency of the PUKmedia reports of these defections increases as we come closer to the elections, as well as the number of "cadres", "members" of Goran returning to the party line. If they were only 100 at a meeting held at the beginning of november, they were 200 at Bitwen the 21/11/2009, and 250 the following day at the PUK's Social Affairs offices in Zakho.
Safin Mala Qara, Goran representative in Erbil and himself former senior member in the PUK, explained that a lot of the defectors were people who were expecting Goran to act as the PUK does, and so provide them with posts and advantages. Once they realised Goran would not reproduce the patronage system it denounces, did he explain in an interview with KNN TV, they went back to the PUK.
Amongst those people are as well some of the teachers, police officers, sacked after the july elections for having supported Goran. The PUK recontacted them and promised to give them back their former jobs, provided they would publicly abjure.
To provide always more participants, it is alleged that some of them went to several meetings, and that at one opportunity the personnel from an administrative office were instructed to attend. Is it true?
The theatralisation of those events and their authoritarian nature, reported by PUKmedia in its inimitable Soviet press-like style, led Shaho Saed, a Goran MP at the autonomous Kurdistan assembly, to say that the repentants are treated as war prisoners surrendering.
In a funny parallel, PUKmedia, during the past week reported the events beside the information "President Barzani pardons 250 prisoners"...
jeudi 26 novembre 2009
The electoral law under criticism.
Sunday 22/11/2009 the electoral law for Iraq's january election has been voted in Baghdad's parliament. It was the second time the law was passed at the assembly. Adopted a first time on the 08, it came immediately under fierce criticism.
The number of representatives is to raise from 275 to 323; to decide how to distribute the new seats, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission relied on the ration cards statistics issued by the Ministry of Trade. But due to the movements of population caused by sectarian violence and political unrest, and the rampant corruption, the accuracy of these records is highly questionable - and so is their use as a reference to decide how to allocate parliamentary seats.
On the 48 additional seats, only three were to be given to the Kurd provinces, so reducing their representation in the parliament. The news sparkled outrage in Kurdistan. Massoud Barzani, president of the autonomous Kurdistan region, declared on the 17 that would the law not be modified, the Kurds would not take part in the elections.
For a reduced representation very likely means the end of the Kurds' demands on Kirkuk.
The city lies outside the boundaries of the autonomous Kurdistan, but is claimed by the Kurds as theirs. an article of the Iraqi constitution, article 140, is all about it. It states that a census, followed by a referendum, will decide of the fate of the city. But the implementation of the article is endlessly reported, and the more they wait, the less likely are the Kurds to ever gain control of the town.
But, finally, the mode of repartition of the new parliamentary seats was modified. Based on the food ration statistics from 2005, a growth ratio of + 2,8% will be added, to have an estimate of the population.
This new development was described as a victory by the Kurd parliamentaries in Baghdad as well as by the Kurdistan authorities. But it was immediately denounced by the former speaker of the Kurdistan assembly, Jawar Namiq. He said in an interview with Rudaw on the 24 that the additional seats distribution, on which attention was focused, was of menial interest and that far from achieving a victory the Kurd parliamentaries in Baghdad failed to address the actual problem, the parts of the electoral law about the vote in Kirkuk.
The way to deal with the highly disputed city, where are concentrated the conflicting interests of Kurds, arabs, Turkmens and others, led to the vote of the law to be reported countless times until a compromised was agreed. For it's what the electoral law is, a compromise opening the doors to any controversy, which had to be adopted because the parliament was reaching the deadline.
It says that the vote will be carried, but that the results won't be definitive before one year. In the interview he gave, Jawar Namiq says other parliamentary blocs in Baghdad will perceive the acceptation of the conditions on Kirkuk as a mark of weakness from the Kurdistan Alliance, representing the interests of Kurdistan in Baghdad. He asserts that the Kurdistan had the power to oppose these conditions and should have done so. Of interest is as well the fact that once again ration cards statistics will be used. It puts in evidence the reluctance of the autorities to carry a census, highly contentious, and likely to provoke unrest in the disputed territories of Kirkuk and its likes, where rival factions are ready to move thousands of people to artificially shift the demographic balance in their favour.
Anyway the vote of the electoral law on the 22/11/2009 is far from being a success. On 275 Iraqi parliamentaries, only 152 attended the vote. The Sunni parliamentaries boycotted the vote to protest against the number of seats given to the refugees - mainly Sunni - living outside Iraq in Syria or Jordan. As well, the law must now be approved by the presidential council, composed of the Iraqi president Jalal Talabani and two vice-presidents. One of them, Tariq al-Hashemi, vetoed the law.
His veto can be overturned by a new vote, requiring a 60% majority, at Baghdad's parliament.
A new round of negociations, agreements, arm-twistings, enticements, and interventions from US officials is so open.
The number of representatives is to raise from 275 to 323; to decide how to distribute the new seats, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission relied on the ration cards statistics issued by the Ministry of Trade. But due to the movements of population caused by sectarian violence and political unrest, and the rampant corruption, the accuracy of these records is highly questionable - and so is their use as a reference to decide how to allocate parliamentary seats.
On the 48 additional seats, only three were to be given to the Kurd provinces, so reducing their representation in the parliament. The news sparkled outrage in Kurdistan. Massoud Barzani, president of the autonomous Kurdistan region, declared on the 17 that would the law not be modified, the Kurds would not take part in the elections.
For a reduced representation very likely means the end of the Kurds' demands on Kirkuk.
The city lies outside the boundaries of the autonomous Kurdistan, but is claimed by the Kurds as theirs. an article of the Iraqi constitution, article 140, is all about it. It states that a census, followed by a referendum, will decide of the fate of the city. But the implementation of the article is endlessly reported, and the more they wait, the less likely are the Kurds to ever gain control of the town.
But, finally, the mode of repartition of the new parliamentary seats was modified. Based on the food ration statistics from 2005, a growth ratio of + 2,8% will be added, to have an estimate of the population.
This new development was described as a victory by the Kurd parliamentaries in Baghdad as well as by the Kurdistan authorities. But it was immediately denounced by the former speaker of the Kurdistan assembly, Jawar Namiq. He said in an interview with Rudaw on the 24 that the additional seats distribution, on which attention was focused, was of menial interest and that far from achieving a victory the Kurd parliamentaries in Baghdad failed to address the actual problem, the parts of the electoral law about the vote in Kirkuk.
The way to deal with the highly disputed city, where are concentrated the conflicting interests of Kurds, arabs, Turkmens and others, led to the vote of the law to be reported countless times until a compromised was agreed. For it's what the electoral law is, a compromise opening the doors to any controversy, which had to be adopted because the parliament was reaching the deadline.
It says that the vote will be carried, but that the results won't be definitive before one year. In the interview he gave, Jawar Namiq says other parliamentary blocs in Baghdad will perceive the acceptation of the conditions on Kirkuk as a mark of weakness from the Kurdistan Alliance, representing the interests of Kurdistan in Baghdad. He asserts that the Kurdistan had the power to oppose these conditions and should have done so. Of interest is as well the fact that once again ration cards statistics will be used. It puts in evidence the reluctance of the autorities to carry a census, highly contentious, and likely to provoke unrest in the disputed territories of Kirkuk and its likes, where rival factions are ready to move thousands of people to artificially shift the demographic balance in their favour.
Anyway the vote of the electoral law on the 22/11/2009 is far from being a success. On 275 Iraqi parliamentaries, only 152 attended the vote. The Sunni parliamentaries boycotted the vote to protest against the number of seats given to the refugees - mainly Sunni - living outside Iraq in Syria or Jordan. As well, the law must now be approved by the presidential council, composed of the Iraqi president Jalal Talabani and two vice-presidents. One of them, Tariq al-Hashemi, vetoed the law.
His veto can be overturned by a new vote, requiring a 60% majority, at Baghdad's parliament.
A new round of negociations, agreements, arm-twistings, enticements, and interventions from US officials is so open.
samedi 21 novembre 2009
Electoral law - a parliamentarian Anfal?
"In the 80s we had Anfal in the mountains. Now it is in the Ministry of Trade." Those words by Shaho Saed, a representative of the Kurd opposition party Goran at Erbil's regional assembly on the 18/11/2009, give an idea of the anger in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan.
Anfal is the series of military campaigns Saddam Hussein launched against the Kurds in the 80s. Thousands of villages were destroyed, their population sent in hostage camps. It culminated with nerve gas attacks on Halabja town in 1988.
In cause is the electoral law for the january election. It was voted the sunday 08/11/2009 after weeks of wranglings, missed deadlines, to be finally pushed through the Iraqi parliament under heavy pressure from the USA. Public interventions from US forces in Iraq, general Odierno, an high-profile visit from vice-president Joe Biden, finally resulted in the law being adopted by 141 of the 195 lawmakers present, out of the 275 the Baghdad parliament has, a number of them not attending in a way of protest. So crucial are these elections for the Obama administration that the US ambassador Christopher Hill allegedly ordered some delegates he found outside the assembly chamber to go to vote. But the relief the international community expressed immediatly was short lived. The Sunni vice-president al-Hashemi vetoed the law, making doubtfull that the elections could be held before the end of january deadline.
According to al-Hashemi the law denies Iraqi refugees living in Syria or Jordan to be fairly represented. But the Kurds, in their autonomous enclave in Northern Iraq, feel directly threatened by this law as well.
From 275, the number of representatives must raise to 323. To decide how to allocate the new seats, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission took the statistics used by the Ministry of Trade to issue food rations. It appears to the Kurds as a blatant attempt to marginalise them. Some Kurd families didn't apply for ration cards and so are not registered in the Ministry of Trade statistics. More, the different factions inside Iraq engineered after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime huge movements of population to alter the balance of power or challenge the presence of other groups. There is as well the black market around the ration cards, complicating the guesswork. Rather than giving accurate numbers, Ministry of Trade datas are so biaised. They give the Kurds only three new seats, while Nineveh province, where some Arab Sunni parties won a large audience in stirring anti-Kurdish resentment, will receive 13 new seats, to reach a total of 31. The total number of seats for the Kurds will amount at 38, or 12% at the new parliament, when they represent 17% of the Iraqi population.
That's what prompted Shaho Saed to compare the use of the ministry's records in the electoral law to an attempt to eliminate the Kurds from the Baghdad assembly, similar to the Anfal campaign.
For in the parliament to come, the Kurds' influence will be diluted, undermining their efforts to have the contentious article 140 implemented.
This article of the Iraqi constitution proposes a roadmap to solve the issue of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Originally a Kurd city, it has been arabised by the successive Iraqi regimes, eager to keep its strategic assets in the hands of the central government. The article proposes a census, followed by a referendum, to decide if the city will go under control of the Kurdistan Regional Government. But the application of article 140 is endlessly reported - the referendum was supposed to take place before the end of 2007. It is a serious issue. The weeks of delays before the 08/11/2009 vote were caused by a dispute around the town. The Arabs and Turkmens, fearing to be marginalised if Kirkuk comes under KRG administration, wanted to have the electoral law taking the 2005 voters lists as references - when Kurds didn't massively come back yet. The Kurds wanted the voters lists to reflect the present population, which advantages them. In its present form, the electoral law doesn't solve anything about the how must be conducted the vote in Kirkuk anyway. It reports the problem, saying that while the 2009 register will be adopted, the results of the vote will be open to contestation during one year. The purpose of this provision is obviously to have the vote taking place in january at any costs, regardless of the multiplicating problems it is sure to bring.
And the Kurds feel that the more they wait, the less likely they are to gain control of the town. They fear to have the situation of non-resolution becoming an accepted one, and so to see Kirkuk escaping them. How to have the article 140 implemented with a diminished representation in Baghdad? And how to oppose, then, amendments of the constitution which would delete the project of a federal state for a strong central government favoured by Nouri al-Malik?
Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region, said tuesday 17/11/2009 that unless the electoral law was deeply modified, the Kurds would not take part to the january election, depriving it to any legitimity.
Now, saturday 21, Iraqi lawmakers are meeting again to try to bypass vice-president veto, and have the national elections taking place in january. But for the Kurds, the issue remains.
Anfal is the series of military campaigns Saddam Hussein launched against the Kurds in the 80s. Thousands of villages were destroyed, their population sent in hostage camps. It culminated with nerve gas attacks on Halabja town in 1988.
In cause is the electoral law for the january election. It was voted the sunday 08/11/2009 after weeks of wranglings, missed deadlines, to be finally pushed through the Iraqi parliament under heavy pressure from the USA. Public interventions from US forces in Iraq, general Odierno, an high-profile visit from vice-president Joe Biden, finally resulted in the law being adopted by 141 of the 195 lawmakers present, out of the 275 the Baghdad parliament has, a number of them not attending in a way of protest. So crucial are these elections for the Obama administration that the US ambassador Christopher Hill allegedly ordered some delegates he found outside the assembly chamber to go to vote. But the relief the international community expressed immediatly was short lived. The Sunni vice-president al-Hashemi vetoed the law, making doubtfull that the elections could be held before the end of january deadline.
According to al-Hashemi the law denies Iraqi refugees living in Syria or Jordan to be fairly represented. But the Kurds, in their autonomous enclave in Northern Iraq, feel directly threatened by this law as well.
From 275, the number of representatives must raise to 323. To decide how to allocate the new seats, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission took the statistics used by the Ministry of Trade to issue food rations. It appears to the Kurds as a blatant attempt to marginalise them. Some Kurd families didn't apply for ration cards and so are not registered in the Ministry of Trade statistics. More, the different factions inside Iraq engineered after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime huge movements of population to alter the balance of power or challenge the presence of other groups. There is as well the black market around the ration cards, complicating the guesswork. Rather than giving accurate numbers, Ministry of Trade datas are so biaised. They give the Kurds only three new seats, while Nineveh province, where some Arab Sunni parties won a large audience in stirring anti-Kurdish resentment, will receive 13 new seats, to reach a total of 31. The total number of seats for the Kurds will amount at 38, or 12% at the new parliament, when they represent 17% of the Iraqi population.
That's what prompted Shaho Saed to compare the use of the ministry's records in the electoral law to an attempt to eliminate the Kurds from the Baghdad assembly, similar to the Anfal campaign.
For in the parliament to come, the Kurds' influence will be diluted, undermining their efforts to have the contentious article 140 implemented.
This article of the Iraqi constitution proposes a roadmap to solve the issue of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Originally a Kurd city, it has been arabised by the successive Iraqi regimes, eager to keep its strategic assets in the hands of the central government. The article proposes a census, followed by a referendum, to decide if the city will go under control of the Kurdistan Regional Government. But the application of article 140 is endlessly reported - the referendum was supposed to take place before the end of 2007. It is a serious issue. The weeks of delays before the 08/11/2009 vote were caused by a dispute around the town. The Arabs and Turkmens, fearing to be marginalised if Kirkuk comes under KRG administration, wanted to have the electoral law taking the 2005 voters lists as references - when Kurds didn't massively come back yet. The Kurds wanted the voters lists to reflect the present population, which advantages them. In its present form, the electoral law doesn't solve anything about the how must be conducted the vote in Kirkuk anyway. It reports the problem, saying that while the 2009 register will be adopted, the results of the vote will be open to contestation during one year. The purpose of this provision is obviously to have the vote taking place in january at any costs, regardless of the multiplicating problems it is sure to bring.
And the Kurds feel that the more they wait, the less likely they are to gain control of the town. They fear to have the situation of non-resolution becoming an accepted one, and so to see Kirkuk escaping them. How to have the article 140 implemented with a diminished representation in Baghdad? And how to oppose, then, amendments of the constitution which would delete the project of a federal state for a strong central government favoured by Nouri al-Malik?
Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region, said tuesday 17/11/2009 that unless the electoral law was deeply modified, the Kurds would not take part to the january election, depriving it to any legitimity.
Now, saturday 21, Iraqi lawmakers are meeting again to try to bypass vice-president veto, and have the national elections taking place in january. But for the Kurds, the issue remains.
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