Syria: a new step in repression?
Tenses are increasing in Syria. Despite the efficiency of its internal security services, president al-assad's Baas regime faces growing dissent from the Kurds. Even if they have been successfully silenced during decades, a series of events recently attracted the attention of the outside world on their fate. There has been the case of the 33 kurds demonstrators who occupied the Syrian embassy in Brussels in 2005. Or the spectacular odyssey of the 123 syrian kurds who landed in Corsica the 22/11/2010 and the controversy following their handling by the french government. There has been as well the month-long protest held in front of Cyprus interior ministry by 150 or so refugees to obtain a status, and a hunger strike in front of the Danish parliament in october by kurds fearing deportation. Their different adventures from court hearings to trials, from detention centres to shelters, the botched legal actions from authorities or the evacuations by anti-riot police come as pale reflections of the repression they endure in their own country.
For during the last five years or so, marginalising kurds even more than they already were seems to have become a matter of national security in the eyes of the Syrian regime. The emergence of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq is seen with anxiety by the neighbouring countries, themselves entangled in conflicts with their own Kurdish populations, and Syria feels threatened by a risk of contagion. "Things definitely worsened after 2003", confirms M. al-Youssef, an exiled member of the Syrian Kurd Unity Party (PYKS). "The Kurds and their political parties are now accused of being separatists. It so makes them the prime target of the Arab nationalim at the core of the Baas ideology." The Qamishli massacre in 2004, the countless reports of arbitrary arrests and brutalities perpetrated by the internal security patrols in the Kurdish provinces, are as many examples of an increased repression.
are we witnessing a new repressive campaign aimed at the Kurds, in the same line than the 1962 "special census" or the building of the "arab belt" along the turkish border? (http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/11/24/group-denial ; http://library/usip/org/articles/1012172.1076/1.pdf ) Some new dispositions have been adopted recently. The presidential decree n*49, passed the 10/09/2009, places the al-Hasakah province, where are living most of the Kurds, under military rule. To buy or sell a property, a clearance must now be obtained from the military security directorate and the political activities department.. According to Kurd opposition representatives and human rights activists, the procedure is not applied in the arab provinces, and has been designed exclusively for the Kurdish areas. It not only prevents Kurds to establish themselves in their native province, but also prevents any kind of investment and development. The economic breakdown so engineered pushes the Kurds to leave the province, were they are replaced by arab colonists. They will find themselves isolated in arab-populated parts of Syria, where their identity will be at term progressively dissolved.
But why a new phase in repression, especially now? It looks the Baas regime is now facing a new generation of militants, more radical and more militant than their predecessors. The Syrian Kurd political groups, some of them anyway, are not any more merely asking for the kurds ostracised by the 1962 "special census" to be granted full citizenship. They demand more. At the moment M. al-Youssef was giving the interview, in the last days of december 2009, three members of the PYKS executive committe were arrested alongside a prominent activist. They were caught after a party conference during which they called for autonomy (http://supportkurds.org/news/call-to-action-kurdish-political-activists-detained-in-syria). The PYD recent congress, in october, was held under the theme "forward with autonomy". Messages passed to jailed PYD members, promising not to arrest any party member if it was lowering its demands, and the arrest of central committe member Issa Ibrahim Hesso just after the october congress, are showing the regime's cioncerns with the revendication of "autonomy".
In this context the new developments in Turkey, with the prolongation of the ceasefire and the rumours about opening negociations, are not good news for the syrian government. As long as the war lasts, Syria remains a usefull ally for the turks. Their strategy of encirclement, aiming at isolating the PKK rebels in their mountains, requiers the Syrian cooperation. A press release from an Anatolian news agency (mentioned in Today's Zaman online edition from the 17/06/2010), talking about military operations by the Syrian army in the kurdish provinces, resulting in the death of 11 PKK fighters, has been dismissed as a manipulation. The journalist Newaf Khalil, who spoke to the BBC the 01/07/2010, said the idea was to entice Syria to join the ongoing offensive against the PKK and PJAK, and to assimilate the syrian kurd political activists to the insurgents, so making them legitimate military targets. The promises of amnisties, regularisation of status, made at several opportunities by president al-Assad, appear as attempts to encourage the 1600 syrian kurds fighting in the PKK's army to desert its ranks and so break the organisation's military force.
For, worryingly for Damascus, numerous syrian kurds joined the PKK in the past (Fehman Huseyin, commander of the PKK army, is a Syrian). Would those well trained men and women be tempted to take back the weapons they laid down and resume the fight in Syria rather than in south-eastern Turkey? Nothing indicated anything like this, and representatives from the PYD, who shares with the PKK a common ideology and similar goals, insist on their determination to achieve their objectives by peacefull means. Nonetheless, this supposed "threat" can be used as a pretext for a new step in repression.
lundi 22 novembre 2010
samedi 20 février 2010
Sulaimaniya: towards martial law ?
Is Kurdistan heading towards martial law? In Sulaimaniya, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's electoral campaign relies on repression. Mechanisms of a putsch in process:
The national elections in Iraq have the potential to wreck the illusionary stabillity of the autonomous Kurdistan. The two parties sharing power in the north-eastern enclave, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Yeketi, must face an opposition whose support grows amongst the population.
Tenses are particularly accute in Sulaimaniya province, for ages the uncontested fiefdom of Jalal Talabani's Yeketi. The PUK is threatened by the Goran reformist movement, whose success during the july 2009 previous elections had the effect of an earthquake in Kurdistan's political landscape. The absolute control the PUK has on the administration and the security forces was unable to prevent Goran's progress since. The party, aware that another vote will not but secure its agony, decided to turn the electoral campaign to a quasi-military campaign. It was made clear by Jalal Talabani himself in an interview given to the newspaper Sharq al-Aswat the 30/12/2009. He then said Goran members were "traitors" and "enemies of Kurdistan": an actual war declaration. The same night a Goran political office in Rania was set on fire.
Since the official start of the electoral campaign on the 07/02/2010 things worsened. Security forces, under control of the PUK, stopped buses to put party flags on them, are harassing journalists, are reluctant to investigate violences against Goran militants.
During the night from the 16 to the 17/02/2010 on salem street, Sulaimaniya's main artery, the hours-long parade of vehicles with flags of the different political formations, typical of electoral campaigns in Kurdistan, was interrupted by automatic fire from the anti-terrorist group. Three persons were slightly wounded and driven to the hospital, where a team came to arrest them. Eleven other persons were arrested the same night, and a TV crew linked to an opposition-linked TV station spent the night in jail.
A putschist scenario
Questioned the following day, Sulaimaniya's governor and the security committee declared they had no responsibility in the events. Is a PUK "putschist command" taking control of the town from Sulaimaniya's civilian government? Hero Talabani, mam Jalal's wife and campaign director for the Yeketi in Sulaimaniya, seconded by Hakim Qader, head of the Asayish - internal security - forces, are working to maintain the town in PUK's grip, elections or not. Accordingly to some security forces officers secretly supporting Goran, some plans have been deviced to harass opposition members at the end of salem street's demonstrations. it would consist in sending patrols off the artery at midnight, when the main street is emptying, to ambush Goran members going back home. The force used for these operations would be, apart the asayish, the anti'terrorist group, under the command of Bavel Talabani, Jalal and Hero's eldest son.
These dispositions are not without provoking discontent amongst regular police forces. The evening of the 17/02/2010 four PUK militants were arrested after having caused troubles. Party cadres went to demand their release to the police chief, who refused and threatened to withdraw his forces from salem street if there was more pressure from the party. He was convoked to a meeting at the PUK political offices with Hero Talabani and Hakim Qader, which didn't end before 01:00.
The outcome of this meeting appeared the following night. That evening, as usual, partisans of PUK and Goran were facing each other, each occupying one side of Salem street. The police forces, in anti-riot gear, are standing at the middle of the artery, preventing any contact between the two crowds.
But, at 22:08, the police withdraws, so letting the rival demonstrators by themselves.
So when a motorcade of four vehicles carrying Mala Bakhtyar, one of the most disliked PUK leaders, appears surrounded by his personal guard, missiles are exchanged between PUK and Goran sides. Suddenly gunfire errupts, fired by civilian dressed gunmen who are charging in the street. While Goran members are evacuating the place the quicker they can, several of them are caught by some plaincloth asayish who came amongst the demonstrators shortly before the troubles.
Salem street in the hands of the PUK
Shortly afterwards arrives the anti-terrorist group. Its troops will sweep Salem street pushing in front of them the few bystanders left. The place is now under control.
It is said two persons were wounded, including one by gunfire. But nobody knows for sure, and there has been no statement on people arrested that night. In a move which appears to have been carefully planned, the town's security committee took pretext of the troubles to ask to the Iraqi High Electoral Commission in Baghdad, for the electoral demonstrations to end at 21:00 every evening. Goran leaders fear this restriction to be imposed to their militants only, and that the PUK will not be affected by this electoral curfew. This proposition in facts leaves the field to the Yeketi, making it easier to prevent an efficient opposition campaign, and then keep the town under control until the elections.
And this day, of course, it is to fear that the voting stations will be heavily monitored by the asayish.
The national elections in Iraq have the potential to wreck the illusionary stabillity of the autonomous Kurdistan. The two parties sharing power in the north-eastern enclave, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Yeketi, must face an opposition whose support grows amongst the population.
Tenses are particularly accute in Sulaimaniya province, for ages the uncontested fiefdom of Jalal Talabani's Yeketi. The PUK is threatened by the Goran reformist movement, whose success during the july 2009 previous elections had the effect of an earthquake in Kurdistan's political landscape. The absolute control the PUK has on the administration and the security forces was unable to prevent Goran's progress since. The party, aware that another vote will not but secure its agony, decided to turn the electoral campaign to a quasi-military campaign. It was made clear by Jalal Talabani himself in an interview given to the newspaper Sharq al-Aswat the 30/12/2009. He then said Goran members were "traitors" and "enemies of Kurdistan": an actual war declaration. The same night a Goran political office in Rania was set on fire.
Since the official start of the electoral campaign on the 07/02/2010 things worsened. Security forces, under control of the PUK, stopped buses to put party flags on them, are harassing journalists, are reluctant to investigate violences against Goran militants.
During the night from the 16 to the 17/02/2010 on salem street, Sulaimaniya's main artery, the hours-long parade of vehicles with flags of the different political formations, typical of electoral campaigns in Kurdistan, was interrupted by automatic fire from the anti-terrorist group. Three persons were slightly wounded and driven to the hospital, where a team came to arrest them. Eleven other persons were arrested the same night, and a TV crew linked to an opposition-linked TV station spent the night in jail.
A putschist scenario
Questioned the following day, Sulaimaniya's governor and the security committee declared they had no responsibility in the events. Is a PUK "putschist command" taking control of the town from Sulaimaniya's civilian government? Hero Talabani, mam Jalal's wife and campaign director for the Yeketi in Sulaimaniya, seconded by Hakim Qader, head of the Asayish - internal security - forces, are working to maintain the town in PUK's grip, elections or not. Accordingly to some security forces officers secretly supporting Goran, some plans have been deviced to harass opposition members at the end of salem street's demonstrations. it would consist in sending patrols off the artery at midnight, when the main street is emptying, to ambush Goran members going back home. The force used for these operations would be, apart the asayish, the anti'terrorist group, under the command of Bavel Talabani, Jalal and Hero's eldest son.
These dispositions are not without provoking discontent amongst regular police forces. The evening of the 17/02/2010 four PUK militants were arrested after having caused troubles. Party cadres went to demand their release to the police chief, who refused and threatened to withdraw his forces from salem street if there was more pressure from the party. He was convoked to a meeting at the PUK political offices with Hero Talabani and Hakim Qader, which didn't end before 01:00.
The outcome of this meeting appeared the following night. That evening, as usual, partisans of PUK and Goran were facing each other, each occupying one side of Salem street. The police forces, in anti-riot gear, are standing at the middle of the artery, preventing any contact between the two crowds.
But, at 22:08, the police withdraws, so letting the rival demonstrators by themselves.
So when a motorcade of four vehicles carrying Mala Bakhtyar, one of the most disliked PUK leaders, appears surrounded by his personal guard, missiles are exchanged between PUK and Goran sides. Suddenly gunfire errupts, fired by civilian dressed gunmen who are charging in the street. While Goran members are evacuating the place the quicker they can, several of them are caught by some plaincloth asayish who came amongst the demonstrators shortly before the troubles.
Salem street in the hands of the PUK
Shortly afterwards arrives the anti-terrorist group. Its troops will sweep Salem street pushing in front of them the few bystanders left. The place is now under control.
It is said two persons were wounded, including one by gunfire. But nobody knows for sure, and there has been no statement on people arrested that night. In a move which appears to have been carefully planned, the town's security committee took pretext of the troubles to ask to the Iraqi High Electoral Commission in Baghdad, for the electoral demonstrations to end at 21:00 every evening. Goran leaders fear this restriction to be imposed to their militants only, and that the PUK will not be affected by this electoral curfew. This proposition in facts leaves the field to the Yeketi, making it easier to prevent an efficient opposition campaign, and then keep the town under control until the elections.
And this day, of course, it is to fear that the voting stations will be heavily monitored by the asayish.
mercredi 3 février 2010
From al-Hasakah to the French shores, the Syrian Kurds
The 123 Syrian Kurds who came to land on the corsican coasts the 22/01/2010 attracted attention on their people's fate. Their adventures from court hearings to shelters and associations, the botched legal actions by the authorities trying to confine them in detention centres, appear pale reflections of the state repression they face in their own country.
Organisations like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch talk talk about arbitrary arrests, people remained in custody without trial, police violence, which look to increase in the last year. The 29, Amnesty started a campaign to obtain the liberation of four kurd activists detained since the end of december, expressing its fears of tortures and mistreatments in the hands of the security forces.
Syrian Kurds are, accordingly to Syria's official statistics, 1,5 million (9% of the total population). "These numbers are wrong", says Mr. Youssef, member of the Syrian Kurd Union Party (PYKS - forbidden), living in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan. A census carried by Syrian intelligence agencies in 2007, with its results kept secret, would be showing the actual figure is around 3 million. "Damascus government wants to marginalise the kurds at any costs. To arbitrarily reduce the number of kurds, it is to deny them their actual importance inside Syria."
In 1962 is organised a "special census" in al-Hasaka province, in the north-east, where are living most of the Syrian Kurds. The official purpose is to find the Turkish Kurds who came to establish themselves illegally in Syria. A "surprise census", one would say, carried in just one day, without providing the targeted population with adequate information. "In fact it was to withdraw their syrian nationality to a significant number of people, to strengthen the grip of the state on a strategic province. A ratio was even given: 28% of the al-Hasakah kurds had to loose their Syrian nationality."
This census divided the Kurds into three categories: the syrian kurds, the foreign ("ajanib") kurds, and the "concealed" ("maktumin") kurds. 120000 kurds, or 20% of the syrian kurds at the time, so became foreigners in their own country. With sometimes amazing results: "It did happen to have a person retaining his citizenship while his brother was becoming a foreigner."
To be a foreign kurd, holder of an orange identity card with the mention "al-Hasakah", means losing the right to travel freely, the right to own a house, and marriage is not recognised by syrian institution. This goes with discrimination at work and restriction of education. The fate of the "concealed" kurds is even worse. Their white residency card is used for identification purpose only and deprives them of any status.
With time, the problem amplifies: the children of the foreign kurds become "concealed", excluding from society an increasing number of kurds. "It is like a disease", says Mr. Youssef, "It is transmitted from generation to generation."
This special census aimed at the kurds was followed by the building of an "arab belt", 375 km long and 15 km wide along the Turkish border, from which the kurds were evicted and replaced by arab settlers. Arab villages so created were given priorities in terms of development, creating so growing inequalities between kurds and arab colonists.
"Tenses increased, and things worsened after 2003", explains Mr. Youssef. "The Kurdistan enclave in Northern Iraq, supported by the americans, excited the Syrian Baas ruling party propaganda, in power since 1963: the kurds were separatists, aiming at breaking national unity. It made us designed targets for the arab nationalism at the heart of the Baas ideology."
Some new dispositions are then taken. The last in date is presidential decree n*49, adopted the 10/09/2009. Pretexting the danger of a military confrontation with Israel (600km away), it places the al-Hasakah province under martial law. The decree means that to buy or sell a property, a clearance must be obtained from the military security agency and the political activities department. This procedure prevents the kurds to establish themselves in their native place, and have them leaving the province. In emptying the border zones from its kurd population, they are cut from the kurds from neighbouring countries, and isolated into Syria. An effective method to restrict the diffusion of kurdish identity...
"It allows as well to target people involved with a kurd political party, anyway forbidden.", adds Mr. Youssef. There is a political opposition, but it is very divided and submitted to heavy pressure from security forces. Its members are routinely harassed, sent in front of military courts, or even kept in custody waiting for a trial for several years.
The exactions, arbitrary arrests, tortures, are not perpetrated by regular police but by the State Security or the military security agency, which have an almost total control on the al-Hasakah province.
Tenses grew to finally erupt in Qamishly ithe 12/03/2004. That day, brawls between football supporters, kurds and arabs, degenerate into pitched battles against the security forces. "Five persons were killed the first day", says Mr. Youssef. "In the three following days, there was an estimated 6000 arrests and 150 wounded. 30 more persons died. Some in fact were tortured to death."
Brutalities are as well commonplace during the compulsory two-and-an-half long national service. Since 2004, 36 kurd recruits died, including 16 in 2009 alone. The "accidents", "suicides" advanced as explanations by the authorities are rejected by the victims' families as well as by Mr. Youssef. "It was barracks violences", he says. "They were not planned, but are the result of a racist climate created by the Baas regime. The discrimination policy encourages these violences. And no actual inquiry has never been carried about these deaths."
In these conditions, the deportation in early december of Syrian Kurds from germany raises fear to have them persecuted once back in Syria. Mr. Youssef points of the surrealistic aspect of the situation. "On what ground have they been sent back to Syria? Accordingly to the Syrian state itself, they are not Syrian nationals." Will it happen the same to the Kurds who landed in Corsica two weeks ago? The initial measures of the French government, placing them in detention centres against regulations, shows the authorities are fearing to see other loads of disenfranchised kurd coming on their shores. Even if the 123 kurds have now reasonable chances to be accepted as refugees, those who would like to imitate them may find a more difficult situation: the immigration minister, Besson, talks about the necessity to modify the present law. Under new dispositions, any clandestine immigrant who would be expelled would be forbidden to apply in any country of the European Union during five long years.
Organisations like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch talk talk about arbitrary arrests, people remained in custody without trial, police violence, which look to increase in the last year. The 29, Amnesty started a campaign to obtain the liberation of four kurd activists detained since the end of december, expressing its fears of tortures and mistreatments in the hands of the security forces.
Syrian Kurds are, accordingly to Syria's official statistics, 1,5 million (9% of the total population). "These numbers are wrong", says Mr. Youssef, member of the Syrian Kurd Union Party (PYKS - forbidden), living in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan. A census carried by Syrian intelligence agencies in 2007, with its results kept secret, would be showing the actual figure is around 3 million. "Damascus government wants to marginalise the kurds at any costs. To arbitrarily reduce the number of kurds, it is to deny them their actual importance inside Syria."
In 1962 is organised a "special census" in al-Hasaka province, in the north-east, where are living most of the Syrian Kurds. The official purpose is to find the Turkish Kurds who came to establish themselves illegally in Syria. A "surprise census", one would say, carried in just one day, without providing the targeted population with adequate information. "In fact it was to withdraw their syrian nationality to a significant number of people, to strengthen the grip of the state on a strategic province. A ratio was even given: 28% of the al-Hasakah kurds had to loose their Syrian nationality."
This census divided the Kurds into three categories: the syrian kurds, the foreign ("ajanib") kurds, and the "concealed" ("maktumin") kurds. 120000 kurds, or 20% of the syrian kurds at the time, so became foreigners in their own country. With sometimes amazing results: "It did happen to have a person retaining his citizenship while his brother was becoming a foreigner."
To be a foreign kurd, holder of an orange identity card with the mention "al-Hasakah", means losing the right to travel freely, the right to own a house, and marriage is not recognised by syrian institution. This goes with discrimination at work and restriction of education. The fate of the "concealed" kurds is even worse. Their white residency card is used for identification purpose only and deprives them of any status.
With time, the problem amplifies: the children of the foreign kurds become "concealed", excluding from society an increasing number of kurds. "It is like a disease", says Mr. Youssef, "It is transmitted from generation to generation."
This special census aimed at the kurds was followed by the building of an "arab belt", 375 km long and 15 km wide along the Turkish border, from which the kurds were evicted and replaced by arab settlers. Arab villages so created were given priorities in terms of development, creating so growing inequalities between kurds and arab colonists.
"Tenses increased, and things worsened after 2003", explains Mr. Youssef. "The Kurdistan enclave in Northern Iraq, supported by the americans, excited the Syrian Baas ruling party propaganda, in power since 1963: the kurds were separatists, aiming at breaking national unity. It made us designed targets for the arab nationalism at the heart of the Baas ideology."
Some new dispositions are then taken. The last in date is presidential decree n*49, adopted the 10/09/2009. Pretexting the danger of a military confrontation with Israel (600km away), it places the al-Hasakah province under martial law. The decree means that to buy or sell a property, a clearance must be obtained from the military security agency and the political activities department. This procedure prevents the kurds to establish themselves in their native place, and have them leaving the province. In emptying the border zones from its kurd population, they are cut from the kurds from neighbouring countries, and isolated into Syria. An effective method to restrict the diffusion of kurdish identity...
"It allows as well to target people involved with a kurd political party, anyway forbidden.", adds Mr. Youssef. There is a political opposition, but it is very divided and submitted to heavy pressure from security forces. Its members are routinely harassed, sent in front of military courts, or even kept in custody waiting for a trial for several years.
The exactions, arbitrary arrests, tortures, are not perpetrated by regular police but by the State Security or the military security agency, which have an almost total control on the al-Hasakah province.
Tenses grew to finally erupt in Qamishly ithe 12/03/2004. That day, brawls between football supporters, kurds and arabs, degenerate into pitched battles against the security forces. "Five persons were killed the first day", says Mr. Youssef. "In the three following days, there was an estimated 6000 arrests and 150 wounded. 30 more persons died. Some in fact were tortured to death."
Brutalities are as well commonplace during the compulsory two-and-an-half long national service. Since 2004, 36 kurd recruits died, including 16 in 2009 alone. The "accidents", "suicides" advanced as explanations by the authorities are rejected by the victims' families as well as by Mr. Youssef. "It was barracks violences", he says. "They were not planned, but are the result of a racist climate created by the Baas regime. The discrimination policy encourages these violences. And no actual inquiry has never been carried about these deaths."
In these conditions, the deportation in early december of Syrian Kurds from germany raises fear to have them persecuted once back in Syria. Mr. Youssef points of the surrealistic aspect of the situation. "On what ground have they been sent back to Syria? Accordingly to the Syrian state itself, they are not Syrian nationals." Will it happen the same to the Kurds who landed in Corsica two weeks ago? The initial measures of the French government, placing them in detention centres against regulations, shows the authorities are fearing to see other loads of disenfranchised kurd coming on their shores. Even if the 123 kurds have now reasonable chances to be accepted as refugees, those who would like to imitate them may find a more difficult situation: the immigration minister, Besson, talks about the necessity to modify the present law. Under new dispositions, any clandestine immigrant who would be expelled would be forbidden to apply in any country of the European Union during five long years.
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