Is Kurdistan heading towards martial law? In Sulaimaniya, Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's electoral campaign relies on repression. Mechanisms of a putsch in process:
The national elections in Iraq have the potential to wreck the illusionary stabillity of the autonomous Kurdistan. The two parties sharing power in the north-eastern enclave, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Yeketi, must face an opposition whose support grows amongst the population.
Tenses are particularly accute in Sulaimaniya province, for ages the uncontested fiefdom of Jalal Talabani's Yeketi. The PUK is threatened by the Goran reformist movement, whose success during the july 2009 previous elections had the effect of an earthquake in Kurdistan's political landscape. The absolute control the PUK has on the administration and the security forces was unable to prevent Goran's progress since. The party, aware that another vote will not but secure its agony, decided to turn the electoral campaign to a quasi-military campaign. It was made clear by Jalal Talabani himself in an interview given to the newspaper Sharq al-Aswat the 30/12/2009. He then said Goran members were "traitors" and "enemies of Kurdistan": an actual war declaration. The same night a Goran political office in Rania was set on fire.
Since the official start of the electoral campaign on the 07/02/2010 things worsened. Security forces, under control of the PUK, stopped buses to put party flags on them, are harassing journalists, are reluctant to investigate violences against Goran militants.
During the night from the 16 to the 17/02/2010 on salem street, Sulaimaniya's main artery, the hours-long parade of vehicles with flags of the different political formations, typical of electoral campaigns in Kurdistan, was interrupted by automatic fire from the anti-terrorist group. Three persons were slightly wounded and driven to the hospital, where a team came to arrest them. Eleven other persons were arrested the same night, and a TV crew linked to an opposition-linked TV station spent the night in jail.
A putschist scenario
Questioned the following day, Sulaimaniya's governor and the security committee declared they had no responsibility in the events. Is a PUK "putschist command" taking control of the town from Sulaimaniya's civilian government? Hero Talabani, mam Jalal's wife and campaign director for the Yeketi in Sulaimaniya, seconded by Hakim Qader, head of the Asayish - internal security - forces, are working to maintain the town in PUK's grip, elections or not. Accordingly to some security forces officers secretly supporting Goran, some plans have been deviced to harass opposition members at the end of salem street's demonstrations. it would consist in sending patrols off the artery at midnight, when the main street is emptying, to ambush Goran members going back home. The force used for these operations would be, apart the asayish, the anti'terrorist group, under the command of Bavel Talabani, Jalal and Hero's eldest son.
These dispositions are not without provoking discontent amongst regular police forces. The evening of the 17/02/2010 four PUK militants were arrested after having caused troubles. Party cadres went to demand their release to the police chief, who refused and threatened to withdraw his forces from salem street if there was more pressure from the party. He was convoked to a meeting at the PUK political offices with Hero Talabani and Hakim Qader, which didn't end before 01:00.
The outcome of this meeting appeared the following night. That evening, as usual, partisans of PUK and Goran were facing each other, each occupying one side of Salem street. The police forces, in anti-riot gear, are standing at the middle of the artery, preventing any contact between the two crowds.
But, at 22:08, the police withdraws, so letting the rival demonstrators by themselves.
So when a motorcade of four vehicles carrying Mala Bakhtyar, one of the most disliked PUK leaders, appears surrounded by his personal guard, missiles are exchanged between PUK and Goran sides. Suddenly gunfire errupts, fired by civilian dressed gunmen who are charging in the street. While Goran members are evacuating the place the quicker they can, several of them are caught by some plaincloth asayish who came amongst the demonstrators shortly before the troubles.
Salem street in the hands of the PUK
Shortly afterwards arrives the anti-terrorist group. Its troops will sweep Salem street pushing in front of them the few bystanders left. The place is now under control.
It is said two persons were wounded, including one by gunfire. But nobody knows for sure, and there has been no statement on people arrested that night. In a move which appears to have been carefully planned, the town's security committee took pretext of the troubles to ask to the Iraqi High Electoral Commission in Baghdad, for the electoral demonstrations to end at 21:00 every evening. Goran leaders fear this restriction to be imposed to their militants only, and that the PUK will not be affected by this electoral curfew. This proposition in facts leaves the field to the Yeketi, making it easier to prevent an efficient opposition campaign, and then keep the town under control until the elections.
And this day, of course, it is to fear that the voting stations will be heavily monitored by the asayish.
samedi 20 février 2010
mercredi 3 février 2010
From al-Hasakah to the French shores, the Syrian Kurds
The 123 Syrian Kurds who came to land on the corsican coasts the 22/01/2010 attracted attention on their people's fate. Their adventures from court hearings to shelters and associations, the botched legal actions by the authorities trying to confine them in detention centres, appear pale reflections of the state repression they face in their own country.
Organisations like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch talk talk about arbitrary arrests, people remained in custody without trial, police violence, which look to increase in the last year. The 29, Amnesty started a campaign to obtain the liberation of four kurd activists detained since the end of december, expressing its fears of tortures and mistreatments in the hands of the security forces.
Syrian Kurds are, accordingly to Syria's official statistics, 1,5 million (9% of the total population). "These numbers are wrong", says Mr. Youssef, member of the Syrian Kurd Union Party (PYKS - forbidden), living in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan. A census carried by Syrian intelligence agencies in 2007, with its results kept secret, would be showing the actual figure is around 3 million. "Damascus government wants to marginalise the kurds at any costs. To arbitrarily reduce the number of kurds, it is to deny them their actual importance inside Syria."
In 1962 is organised a "special census" in al-Hasaka province, in the north-east, where are living most of the Syrian Kurds. The official purpose is to find the Turkish Kurds who came to establish themselves illegally in Syria. A "surprise census", one would say, carried in just one day, without providing the targeted population with adequate information. "In fact it was to withdraw their syrian nationality to a significant number of people, to strengthen the grip of the state on a strategic province. A ratio was even given: 28% of the al-Hasakah kurds had to loose their Syrian nationality."
This census divided the Kurds into three categories: the syrian kurds, the foreign ("ajanib") kurds, and the "concealed" ("maktumin") kurds. 120000 kurds, or 20% of the syrian kurds at the time, so became foreigners in their own country. With sometimes amazing results: "It did happen to have a person retaining his citizenship while his brother was becoming a foreigner."
To be a foreign kurd, holder of an orange identity card with the mention "al-Hasakah", means losing the right to travel freely, the right to own a house, and marriage is not recognised by syrian institution. This goes with discrimination at work and restriction of education. The fate of the "concealed" kurds is even worse. Their white residency card is used for identification purpose only and deprives them of any status.
With time, the problem amplifies: the children of the foreign kurds become "concealed", excluding from society an increasing number of kurds. "It is like a disease", says Mr. Youssef, "It is transmitted from generation to generation."
This special census aimed at the kurds was followed by the building of an "arab belt", 375 km long and 15 km wide along the Turkish border, from which the kurds were evicted and replaced by arab settlers. Arab villages so created were given priorities in terms of development, creating so growing inequalities between kurds and arab colonists.
"Tenses increased, and things worsened after 2003", explains Mr. Youssef. "The Kurdistan enclave in Northern Iraq, supported by the americans, excited the Syrian Baas ruling party propaganda, in power since 1963: the kurds were separatists, aiming at breaking national unity. It made us designed targets for the arab nationalism at the heart of the Baas ideology."
Some new dispositions are then taken. The last in date is presidential decree n*49, adopted the 10/09/2009. Pretexting the danger of a military confrontation with Israel (600km away), it places the al-Hasakah province under martial law. The decree means that to buy or sell a property, a clearance must be obtained from the military security agency and the political activities department. This procedure prevents the kurds to establish themselves in their native place, and have them leaving the province. In emptying the border zones from its kurd population, they are cut from the kurds from neighbouring countries, and isolated into Syria. An effective method to restrict the diffusion of kurdish identity...
"It allows as well to target people involved with a kurd political party, anyway forbidden.", adds Mr. Youssef. There is a political opposition, but it is very divided and submitted to heavy pressure from security forces. Its members are routinely harassed, sent in front of military courts, or even kept in custody waiting for a trial for several years.
The exactions, arbitrary arrests, tortures, are not perpetrated by regular police but by the State Security or the military security agency, which have an almost total control on the al-Hasakah province.
Tenses grew to finally erupt in Qamishly ithe 12/03/2004. That day, brawls between football supporters, kurds and arabs, degenerate into pitched battles against the security forces. "Five persons were killed the first day", says Mr. Youssef. "In the three following days, there was an estimated 6000 arrests and 150 wounded. 30 more persons died. Some in fact were tortured to death."
Brutalities are as well commonplace during the compulsory two-and-an-half long national service. Since 2004, 36 kurd recruits died, including 16 in 2009 alone. The "accidents", "suicides" advanced as explanations by the authorities are rejected by the victims' families as well as by Mr. Youssef. "It was barracks violences", he says. "They were not planned, but are the result of a racist climate created by the Baas regime. The discrimination policy encourages these violences. And no actual inquiry has never been carried about these deaths."
In these conditions, the deportation in early december of Syrian Kurds from germany raises fear to have them persecuted once back in Syria. Mr. Youssef points of the surrealistic aspect of the situation. "On what ground have they been sent back to Syria? Accordingly to the Syrian state itself, they are not Syrian nationals." Will it happen the same to the Kurds who landed in Corsica two weeks ago? The initial measures of the French government, placing them in detention centres against regulations, shows the authorities are fearing to see other loads of disenfranchised kurd coming on their shores. Even if the 123 kurds have now reasonable chances to be accepted as refugees, those who would like to imitate them may find a more difficult situation: the immigration minister, Besson, talks about the necessity to modify the present law. Under new dispositions, any clandestine immigrant who would be expelled would be forbidden to apply in any country of the European Union during five long years.
Organisations like Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch talk talk about arbitrary arrests, people remained in custody without trial, police violence, which look to increase in the last year. The 29, Amnesty started a campaign to obtain the liberation of four kurd activists detained since the end of december, expressing its fears of tortures and mistreatments in the hands of the security forces.
Syrian Kurds are, accordingly to Syria's official statistics, 1,5 million (9% of the total population). "These numbers are wrong", says Mr. Youssef, member of the Syrian Kurd Union Party (PYKS - forbidden), living in exile in Iraqi Kurdistan. A census carried by Syrian intelligence agencies in 2007, with its results kept secret, would be showing the actual figure is around 3 million. "Damascus government wants to marginalise the kurds at any costs. To arbitrarily reduce the number of kurds, it is to deny them their actual importance inside Syria."
In 1962 is organised a "special census" in al-Hasaka province, in the north-east, where are living most of the Syrian Kurds. The official purpose is to find the Turkish Kurds who came to establish themselves illegally in Syria. A "surprise census", one would say, carried in just one day, without providing the targeted population with adequate information. "In fact it was to withdraw their syrian nationality to a significant number of people, to strengthen the grip of the state on a strategic province. A ratio was even given: 28% of the al-Hasakah kurds had to loose their Syrian nationality."
This census divided the Kurds into three categories: the syrian kurds, the foreign ("ajanib") kurds, and the "concealed" ("maktumin") kurds. 120000 kurds, or 20% of the syrian kurds at the time, so became foreigners in their own country. With sometimes amazing results: "It did happen to have a person retaining his citizenship while his brother was becoming a foreigner."
To be a foreign kurd, holder of an orange identity card with the mention "al-Hasakah", means losing the right to travel freely, the right to own a house, and marriage is not recognised by syrian institution. This goes with discrimination at work and restriction of education. The fate of the "concealed" kurds is even worse. Their white residency card is used for identification purpose only and deprives them of any status.
With time, the problem amplifies: the children of the foreign kurds become "concealed", excluding from society an increasing number of kurds. "It is like a disease", says Mr. Youssef, "It is transmitted from generation to generation."
This special census aimed at the kurds was followed by the building of an "arab belt", 375 km long and 15 km wide along the Turkish border, from which the kurds were evicted and replaced by arab settlers. Arab villages so created were given priorities in terms of development, creating so growing inequalities between kurds and arab colonists.
"Tenses increased, and things worsened after 2003", explains Mr. Youssef. "The Kurdistan enclave in Northern Iraq, supported by the americans, excited the Syrian Baas ruling party propaganda, in power since 1963: the kurds were separatists, aiming at breaking national unity. It made us designed targets for the arab nationalism at the heart of the Baas ideology."
Some new dispositions are then taken. The last in date is presidential decree n*49, adopted the 10/09/2009. Pretexting the danger of a military confrontation with Israel (600km away), it places the al-Hasakah province under martial law. The decree means that to buy or sell a property, a clearance must be obtained from the military security agency and the political activities department. This procedure prevents the kurds to establish themselves in their native place, and have them leaving the province. In emptying the border zones from its kurd population, they are cut from the kurds from neighbouring countries, and isolated into Syria. An effective method to restrict the diffusion of kurdish identity...
"It allows as well to target people involved with a kurd political party, anyway forbidden.", adds Mr. Youssef. There is a political opposition, but it is very divided and submitted to heavy pressure from security forces. Its members are routinely harassed, sent in front of military courts, or even kept in custody waiting for a trial for several years.
The exactions, arbitrary arrests, tortures, are not perpetrated by regular police but by the State Security or the military security agency, which have an almost total control on the al-Hasakah province.
Tenses grew to finally erupt in Qamishly ithe 12/03/2004. That day, brawls between football supporters, kurds and arabs, degenerate into pitched battles against the security forces. "Five persons were killed the first day", says Mr. Youssef. "In the three following days, there was an estimated 6000 arrests and 150 wounded. 30 more persons died. Some in fact were tortured to death."
Brutalities are as well commonplace during the compulsory two-and-an-half long national service. Since 2004, 36 kurd recruits died, including 16 in 2009 alone. The "accidents", "suicides" advanced as explanations by the authorities are rejected by the victims' families as well as by Mr. Youssef. "It was barracks violences", he says. "They were not planned, but are the result of a racist climate created by the Baas regime. The discrimination policy encourages these violences. And no actual inquiry has never been carried about these deaths."
In these conditions, the deportation in early december of Syrian Kurds from germany raises fear to have them persecuted once back in Syria. Mr. Youssef points of the surrealistic aspect of the situation. "On what ground have they been sent back to Syria? Accordingly to the Syrian state itself, they are not Syrian nationals." Will it happen the same to the Kurds who landed in Corsica two weeks ago? The initial measures of the French government, placing them in detention centres against regulations, shows the authorities are fearing to see other loads of disenfranchised kurd coming on their shores. Even if the 123 kurds have now reasonable chances to be accepted as refugees, those who would like to imitate them may find a more difficult situation: the immigration minister, Besson, talks about the necessity to modify the present law. Under new dispositions, any clandestine immigrant who would be expelled would be forbidden to apply in any country of the European Union during five long years.
jeudi 31 décembre 2009
PUK new year wishes to the opposition
The members of the reformist movement Goran, who are targeted by a campaign of harassment from the Kurdistan's ruling party Patriotic Union, must brace themselves for a hard 2010 year.
Jalal Talabani, president of Iraq and leader of the PUK, spoke the 31/12/2009 in an interview about the party's relation with Nerchirvan Mustapha, Goran founder. "Nerchirvan Mustapha is an enemy of the PUK", did he say to the journalist of Sharq Awsat, one of the most important arab-language Iraqi publications. Asked if the was any possibility for the Patriotic Union to work with Mustapha's opposition list for the coming Iraqi national elections, mam Jalal said that Nerchirvan Mustapha was against the PUK and against Kurdistan region's government. He said Mustapha didn't want any kind of coalition, and accused him to try to split the Sulaimaniya governorate from the rest of Kurdistan.
It is not the first time Goran is facing this kind of declaration. At the end of november, at a conference with the directors of the PUK newspapers and TV stations, Jalal Talabani instructed them to increase the attacks against Goran and to undermine its own press machine. Heinous articles are published in the PUK press, sometimes on an everyday basis, in which Goran is described as a nest of conspirators and traitors to the party.
But this time, to illustrate Jalal Talabani's declaration, the Goran party office of MP Siwail Osman Ahmed in Koya has been destroyed by an arson attack perpetrated by unknown men the 30/12/2009 in the evening.
The 01/01/2010, in Kurd nuce, PUK's official newspaper, Jalal Talabani gave an interview as leader of the party. He condemned the attack in Koya and promised he would order the asayish to solve the affair, so tacitly admitting the asayish are a force controlled by the PUK.
The harassment, beatings, and recently murder, against Goran can be seen as PUK's electoral campaign. The Iraqi national elections, to be held in march, will be a fight for survival for the PUK. The party must fight to keep control of its territory in Sulaimaniya governorate, where Goran emerged as a force able to defy its - until now - absolute power. But the PUK must as well face the ambitions of its partner in the Kurdistan's regional government, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who could seize the opportunity of the PUK-Goran fight to expand its power at the expenses of its ally.
The PUK is so in danger.
The riots where the residents of Piramagrun took control of the town for the day the 23/12/2009 illustrate the exasperation of the population about the derelict infrastructures, added to the rampant corruption of the PUK and its totalitarist rule. The claims made by the PUK that Goran organised the unrest were dismissed by the demonstrators themselves.
Nonetheless, Goran's popularity can only grow from this kind of events, and the PUK leadership is perfectly aware of it. The war against the traitors will so intensify.
For it is what Jalal Talabani offered to the opposition as new year wishes: a declaration of war.
Jalal Talabani, president of Iraq and leader of the PUK, spoke the 31/12/2009 in an interview about the party's relation with Nerchirvan Mustapha, Goran founder. "Nerchirvan Mustapha is an enemy of the PUK", did he say to the journalist of Sharq Awsat, one of the most important arab-language Iraqi publications. Asked if the was any possibility for the Patriotic Union to work with Mustapha's opposition list for the coming Iraqi national elections, mam Jalal said that Nerchirvan Mustapha was against the PUK and against Kurdistan region's government. He said Mustapha didn't want any kind of coalition, and accused him to try to split the Sulaimaniya governorate from the rest of Kurdistan.
It is not the first time Goran is facing this kind of declaration. At the end of november, at a conference with the directors of the PUK newspapers and TV stations, Jalal Talabani instructed them to increase the attacks against Goran and to undermine its own press machine. Heinous articles are published in the PUK press, sometimes on an everyday basis, in which Goran is described as a nest of conspirators and traitors to the party.
But this time, to illustrate Jalal Talabani's declaration, the Goran party office of MP Siwail Osman Ahmed in Koya has been destroyed by an arson attack perpetrated by unknown men the 30/12/2009 in the evening.
The 01/01/2010, in Kurd nuce, PUK's official newspaper, Jalal Talabani gave an interview as leader of the party. He condemned the attack in Koya and promised he would order the asayish to solve the affair, so tacitly admitting the asayish are a force controlled by the PUK.
The harassment, beatings, and recently murder, against Goran can be seen as PUK's electoral campaign. The Iraqi national elections, to be held in march, will be a fight for survival for the PUK. The party must fight to keep control of its territory in Sulaimaniya governorate, where Goran emerged as a force able to defy its - until now - absolute power. But the PUK must as well face the ambitions of its partner in the Kurdistan's regional government, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who could seize the opportunity of the PUK-Goran fight to expand its power at the expenses of its ally.
The PUK is so in danger.
The riots where the residents of Piramagrun took control of the town for the day the 23/12/2009 illustrate the exasperation of the population about the derelict infrastructures, added to the rampant corruption of the PUK and its totalitarist rule. The claims made by the PUK that Goran organised the unrest were dismissed by the demonstrators themselves.
Nonetheless, Goran's popularity can only grow from this kind of events, and the PUK leadership is perfectly aware of it. The war against the traitors will so intensify.
For it is what Jalal Talabani offered to the opposition as new year wishes: a declaration of war.
dimanche 27 décembre 2009
Anger spreads turmoil and riots in Kurdistan
Halabja, in the south of the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, is an impoverished town still bearing the marks of the chemical attack carried out by Saddam Hussein's air force the 16/03/1988. It is there that in 2006, street protests against the misrule of ruling party Patriotic Union of Kurdistan culminated in the burning of the monument offered to the town by the PUK leader Jalal Talabani. Since, there is a heavy security presence in the town. The Asayish, the militarised force of the internal security directorate, are everywhere, in front of every official building or administrative service, reflecting the authorities' fear of a re-edition of the 2006 riots.
But despite this heavy security presence it is there that Rauf Zarayani, a former peshmerga who fought against Saddam Hussein, was assassinated in broad daylight.
It was around 16:00 the 25/12/2009 when a white BMW stopped in front of his house and that a man get out with a handgun. Rauf Zarayani didn't lose the reflex acquired during his years of struggle: some witnesses alleged he seized his own handgun and tried to fire at his aggressor. But the weapon misfired and the killer shot Rauf Zarayani four times, killing him.
At his funerals, the day after, were present some prominent figures of the Goran opposition movement including general mam Rostam, who knew the victim from the war against Saddam Hussein.
For Rauf Zarayani was himself a Goran activist, and people say it is the reason for his murder.
Goran is a movement created by Nerchirvan Mustapha, formerly PUK's n*2. The formation recruits mainly amongst PUK members dissatisfied with the party's corruption, and its reformist agenda made it hugely popular amongst the population. Its unexpected good results during the july 2009 provincial elections made it target number one for the PUK leadership, afraid to lose its grip on his fiefdom of Sulaimaniya governorate. In the months following the elections, there has been beatings, and even a botched abduction attempt, against Goran members or journalists critical of the PUK.
In this context, the responsibility for Rauf Zarayani's murder has been attributed to the PUK. A police source said that a witness was able to write the registration number of the killers' vehicle and to transmit it to Halabja's police. From this clue, a suspect was identified in Kirkuk, a town outside the autonomous Kurdistan jurisdiction but claimed by the Kurds, where the PUK is very influential. But, still accordingly to this police source, the alleged gunman couldn't be arrested, for there wasn't any evidence to produce against him. He was so let free. It is widely believed this man is actually a member of a PUK secret services - the Dezgay Zanyari - assassination squad.
And there is ground to give to this rumour. Kurdmedia.net, a London based information website, reported on the 18/11/2009 that the PUK asayish established a section, the "Lijney Mutabaa", to harass political dissidents. A Goran member, Dara Tofiq Agha, was himself attacked in early november with metal bars. Anonymous sources from inside the asayish assert that the perpetrators were members of the anti-terrorist team, originally trained by the americans, which is under the direct orders of Bavel Talabani, mam Jalal's son.
These kind of attacks appear to have increased recently, reflecting the present anxiety of the PUK leadership about the coming Iraqi national elections, perceived as decisive inside Kurdistan and likely to seal the fate of the PUK.
In the same time, at Piramagrun, one of those towns established along Kurdistan's roads to harbour the Kurds chased from their mountain villages by Saddam Hussein's troops and where they were conveniently maintained at the mercy of any retaliation raid by the Iraqi army, saw its residents take to the street in defiance of the PUK authority. It was the worst unrest in the Kurdistan region since the Halabja demonstrations in 2006 and, in a striking parallel, were motivated by the poor amenities and the lack of services.
A KNN TV report made in november was showing the poor conditions in the township, so when the PUK appointed mayor Awat Tofiq (no relation to Dara Tofiq Agha) recently said during a TV interview that Piramagrun people were "blind" and were unaware of the progresses made in the town, outrage spread amongst inhabitants.
The day after, 23/12/2009, a crowd gathered in front of the municipality building, demanding the mayor and his team's resignation and that they leave the town. Some officials were beaten, and then the demonstrators set a roadblock on the artery Sulaimaniya-Duhkan. Some police reinforcement called from Sulaimaniya fired in the air to disperse the demonstrators, but had to withdraw while the rioters set two police vehicles on fire.
In the evening, asayish and peshmergas seized control of the town, amongst fear that they would conduct house-to-house search under the cover of the night. The outcome of the riots left dozens of injured and official buidings vandalised. Two asayish working at Sulaimaniya who were off duty and took part to the unrest were arrested. Some protesters went to hide in mountain villages by fear of being arrested too, and in the mosques, the mollahs condemned in advance any arrest the police would make.
But nothing happened. Once they were sure the protests wouldn't resume, the asayish and the troops withdrew, and the situation came back to normality: derelict infrastructure, supply shortage, and a PUK-appointed mayor, as a replacement to the previous one. From the outside, it looks as if nothing happened. The township remains as neglected as before, and the residents are under the rule of an official they didn't elect.
But dissatisfaction is growing. In Said Sadeq, a town outside Halabja suffering the same kind of problems that in Piramagrun, 100 plots of land were given to PUK members in Mosul. The population, angry to see their assets given to party henchmen, decided to organise a protest. But the demonstration, supposed to take place on the 29, was cancelled on the orders of the asayish. During the night before some troop movements were observed to protect the residence of Jalal Talabani outside Sulaimaniya.
There is so a fear amongst the PUK leadership to see the riots amplify as larger protests, and ultimately lead to the Patriotic Union's hold on Kurdistan to be broken. A scenario similar to the contestation in former Soviet Union republics, with a regime change like in Georgia or Ukrain, becomes more and more of a possibility.
As a result, one can expect the Patriotic Union to rely more and more heavily on the security forces to keep its control on Kurdistan.
But despite this heavy security presence it is there that Rauf Zarayani, a former peshmerga who fought against Saddam Hussein, was assassinated in broad daylight.
It was around 16:00 the 25/12/2009 when a white BMW stopped in front of his house and that a man get out with a handgun. Rauf Zarayani didn't lose the reflex acquired during his years of struggle: some witnesses alleged he seized his own handgun and tried to fire at his aggressor. But the weapon misfired and the killer shot Rauf Zarayani four times, killing him.
At his funerals, the day after, were present some prominent figures of the Goran opposition movement including general mam Rostam, who knew the victim from the war against Saddam Hussein.
For Rauf Zarayani was himself a Goran activist, and people say it is the reason for his murder.
Goran is a movement created by Nerchirvan Mustapha, formerly PUK's n*2. The formation recruits mainly amongst PUK members dissatisfied with the party's corruption, and its reformist agenda made it hugely popular amongst the population. Its unexpected good results during the july 2009 provincial elections made it target number one for the PUK leadership, afraid to lose its grip on his fiefdom of Sulaimaniya governorate. In the months following the elections, there has been beatings, and even a botched abduction attempt, against Goran members or journalists critical of the PUK.
In this context, the responsibility for Rauf Zarayani's murder has been attributed to the PUK. A police source said that a witness was able to write the registration number of the killers' vehicle and to transmit it to Halabja's police. From this clue, a suspect was identified in Kirkuk, a town outside the autonomous Kurdistan jurisdiction but claimed by the Kurds, where the PUK is very influential. But, still accordingly to this police source, the alleged gunman couldn't be arrested, for there wasn't any evidence to produce against him. He was so let free. It is widely believed this man is actually a member of a PUK secret services - the Dezgay Zanyari - assassination squad.
And there is ground to give to this rumour. Kurdmedia.net, a London based information website, reported on the 18/11/2009 that the PUK asayish established a section, the "Lijney Mutabaa", to harass political dissidents. A Goran member, Dara Tofiq Agha, was himself attacked in early november with metal bars. Anonymous sources from inside the asayish assert that the perpetrators were members of the anti-terrorist team, originally trained by the americans, which is under the direct orders of Bavel Talabani, mam Jalal's son.
These kind of attacks appear to have increased recently, reflecting the present anxiety of the PUK leadership about the coming Iraqi national elections, perceived as decisive inside Kurdistan and likely to seal the fate of the PUK.
In the same time, at Piramagrun, one of those towns established along Kurdistan's roads to harbour the Kurds chased from their mountain villages by Saddam Hussein's troops and where they were conveniently maintained at the mercy of any retaliation raid by the Iraqi army, saw its residents take to the street in defiance of the PUK authority. It was the worst unrest in the Kurdistan region since the Halabja demonstrations in 2006 and, in a striking parallel, were motivated by the poor amenities and the lack of services.
A KNN TV report made in november was showing the poor conditions in the township, so when the PUK appointed mayor Awat Tofiq (no relation to Dara Tofiq Agha) recently said during a TV interview that Piramagrun people were "blind" and were unaware of the progresses made in the town, outrage spread amongst inhabitants.
The day after, 23/12/2009, a crowd gathered in front of the municipality building, demanding the mayor and his team's resignation and that they leave the town. Some officials were beaten, and then the demonstrators set a roadblock on the artery Sulaimaniya-Duhkan. Some police reinforcement called from Sulaimaniya fired in the air to disperse the demonstrators, but had to withdraw while the rioters set two police vehicles on fire.
In the evening, asayish and peshmergas seized control of the town, amongst fear that they would conduct house-to-house search under the cover of the night. The outcome of the riots left dozens of injured and official buidings vandalised. Two asayish working at Sulaimaniya who were off duty and took part to the unrest were arrested. Some protesters went to hide in mountain villages by fear of being arrested too, and in the mosques, the mollahs condemned in advance any arrest the police would make.
But nothing happened. Once they were sure the protests wouldn't resume, the asayish and the troops withdrew, and the situation came back to normality: derelict infrastructure, supply shortage, and a PUK-appointed mayor, as a replacement to the previous one. From the outside, it looks as if nothing happened. The township remains as neglected as before, and the residents are under the rule of an official they didn't elect.
But dissatisfaction is growing. In Said Sadeq, a town outside Halabja suffering the same kind of problems that in Piramagrun, 100 plots of land were given to PUK members in Mosul. The population, angry to see their assets given to party henchmen, decided to organise a protest. But the demonstration, supposed to take place on the 29, was cancelled on the orders of the asayish. During the night before some troop movements were observed to protect the residence of Jalal Talabani outside Sulaimaniya.
There is so a fear amongst the PUK leadership to see the riots amplify as larger protests, and ultimately lead to the Patriotic Union's hold on Kurdistan to be broken. A scenario similar to the contestation in former Soviet Union republics, with a regime change like in Georgia or Ukrain, becomes more and more of a possibility.
As a result, one can expect the Patriotic Union to rely more and more heavily on the security forces to keep its control on Kurdistan.
lundi 14 décembre 2009
The water issue: a strategic weapon against the Kurds?
In antiquity, Iraq was known as Mesopotamia, "between the two rivers", understand the Tigris and the Euphrates. It says how important are those two rivers to the country. But during the summer, their water level reached a critical low, to the point that the Iraqi ministries of water resources and of agriculture qualified the situation as disastrous.
The southern provinces were then facing an unprecedented crisis. Due to lack of drinkable water, the cattle started to die and several villages had to be evacuated. The situation was particularly dire in the south's marshlands, home to the marsh arabs. The water level there was at only 20% of its original level. At the end of august the ministry of water resources was saying that 300000 of the marsh arabs had to leave their dwellings and resettle in nearby towns, straining their already scarce resources.
The pumps of the power stations could not reach the water any more, meaning that the electricity supply was disrupted. The impact was severe on an industry already crippled by years of violence. Nasiriyah, Iraq's fourth largest city, was facing the perspective of a blackout.
But more important were the consequences for agriculture, relying heavily on irrigation. Large swathes of once fertile farmlands are drying and turning into desert. The agriculture ministry was saying that only 40 to 50% of the land devoted to culture could be used. As a result Iraq can't meet the needs of its population and has to import most of its food. Another effect is an increased dependency on the oil-related economy, already around 85% of Iraq's income, making the country highly vulnerable to a crisis.
The causes of this disaster were the poor rainfall of the past years, and the building of dams upstream by the neighbouring countries. On the Euphrates alone, Turkey built five dams, Syria two. Negotiations were held, with mixed results, to have Iran, Turkey and Syria releasing higher volumes of water. But it remains that Iraq's water supply is decided by foreign powers, all of them involved in Iraq's internal politics. Would they feel the need of it, they can actually dry the country.
Kurdistan appeared, at first, to have been spared Iraq's water crisis. Its highlands benefit from more important rainfalls than the rest of Iraq, preserving it from drought. And could the province become Iraq's breadbasket, it would help it in its difficult relations with the central government.
But recently the Kurdistan Regional Government's water resources ministry announced it would carry a common study with Iraq's water resources ministry and the United Nations on drought in Makhmur and Karmayan districts, where water level fell at 60% of its original level.
Will Kurdistan face the same fate than central and southern Iraq?
Of great concern as well is the building in Turkey of a dam at Ilisu. Once the dam will be completed, it will affect Kurdistan water supply. Has this problem been addressed when a Turk delegation made an historical visit in Erbil, Kurdistan's capital, in november? Trade with Turkey represents around 60% of Kurdistan's commercial relations. Petrol exports are going by Turkey as well.
This dam will make the KRG even more dependent from Ankara, which is pursuing its own agenda in Iraq and is cleverly using the antagonism between Kurdistan and the central government. The Turks can ask everything they want from the Kurds: for them to give up their claims on Kirkuk, for them to collaborate against the PKK,... landlocked and isolated, the autonomous Kurdistan won't be in a position to refuse them anything.
And, more, the autonomous Kurdistan may find itself caught in a crossfire would the water dispute between Iraq on one side, and Iran, Turkey and Syria on the other side worsen. In a press conference held the 08/12/2009, the Iraqi government threatened to sever economic ties with Iran and Turkey if they were not showing more cooperation on the water issue.
It is an indirect, but clear menace, against Kurdistan. The province lies on the border with these two countries and survives with the trade made with them. Any fracture of the links between Iraq and its powerful neighbours would suffocate Kurdistan in no time.
A way to make the Kurds aware of their vulnerability ahead of the coming Iraqi national elections, in which some factions are seeing the opportunity, at term, to dispose of the Kurdish demands for a federal state.
Sources = "As Iraq runs dry a plague of snakes is unleashed", P. Cockburn, The Independent 15/06/2009
"Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq", M. Chulov, The Guardian 26/08/2009
The southern provinces were then facing an unprecedented crisis. Due to lack of drinkable water, the cattle started to die and several villages had to be evacuated. The situation was particularly dire in the south's marshlands, home to the marsh arabs. The water level there was at only 20% of its original level. At the end of august the ministry of water resources was saying that 300000 of the marsh arabs had to leave their dwellings and resettle in nearby towns, straining their already scarce resources.
The pumps of the power stations could not reach the water any more, meaning that the electricity supply was disrupted. The impact was severe on an industry already crippled by years of violence. Nasiriyah, Iraq's fourth largest city, was facing the perspective of a blackout.
But more important were the consequences for agriculture, relying heavily on irrigation. Large swathes of once fertile farmlands are drying and turning into desert. The agriculture ministry was saying that only 40 to 50% of the land devoted to culture could be used. As a result Iraq can't meet the needs of its population and has to import most of its food. Another effect is an increased dependency on the oil-related economy, already around 85% of Iraq's income, making the country highly vulnerable to a crisis.
The causes of this disaster were the poor rainfall of the past years, and the building of dams upstream by the neighbouring countries. On the Euphrates alone, Turkey built five dams, Syria two. Negotiations were held, with mixed results, to have Iran, Turkey and Syria releasing higher volumes of water. But it remains that Iraq's water supply is decided by foreign powers, all of them involved in Iraq's internal politics. Would they feel the need of it, they can actually dry the country.
Kurdistan appeared, at first, to have been spared Iraq's water crisis. Its highlands benefit from more important rainfalls than the rest of Iraq, preserving it from drought. And could the province become Iraq's breadbasket, it would help it in its difficult relations with the central government.
But recently the Kurdistan Regional Government's water resources ministry announced it would carry a common study with Iraq's water resources ministry and the United Nations on drought in Makhmur and Karmayan districts, where water level fell at 60% of its original level.
Will Kurdistan face the same fate than central and southern Iraq?
Of great concern as well is the building in Turkey of a dam at Ilisu. Once the dam will be completed, it will affect Kurdistan water supply. Has this problem been addressed when a Turk delegation made an historical visit in Erbil, Kurdistan's capital, in november? Trade with Turkey represents around 60% of Kurdistan's commercial relations. Petrol exports are going by Turkey as well.
This dam will make the KRG even more dependent from Ankara, which is pursuing its own agenda in Iraq and is cleverly using the antagonism between Kurdistan and the central government. The Turks can ask everything they want from the Kurds: for them to give up their claims on Kirkuk, for them to collaborate against the PKK,... landlocked and isolated, the autonomous Kurdistan won't be in a position to refuse them anything.
And, more, the autonomous Kurdistan may find itself caught in a crossfire would the water dispute between Iraq on one side, and Iran, Turkey and Syria on the other side worsen. In a press conference held the 08/12/2009, the Iraqi government threatened to sever economic ties with Iran and Turkey if they were not showing more cooperation on the water issue.
It is an indirect, but clear menace, against Kurdistan. The province lies on the border with these two countries and survives with the trade made with them. Any fracture of the links between Iraq and its powerful neighbours would suffocate Kurdistan in no time.
A way to make the Kurds aware of their vulnerability ahead of the coming Iraqi national elections, in which some factions are seeing the opportunity, at term, to dispose of the Kurdish demands for a federal state.
Sources = "As Iraq runs dry a plague of snakes is unleashed", P. Cockburn, The Independent 15/06/2009
"Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq", M. Chulov, The Guardian 26/08/2009
lundi 7 décembre 2009
The electoral law: a step backward for the Kurds.
The electoral law for Iraq's national elections has been voted - at last! Immediately the UN and the USA expressed their satisfaction, and so did the different protagonists involved in the endless dispute around the text.
There is, nonetheless, nothing to rejoice about. The text was voted unanimously, it is true, but there was only 138 parliamentarians on the 275 the Baghdad assembly actually has, 138 being the minimum required by the constitution for a parliamentary session to be held. It took the whole sunday and last minute phone calls from Barack Obama and Joe Biden to muster this number, and have the law passed at 23:50, ten minutes before the ultimate deadline.
The law could be passed because the Kurd representatives, who were contesting the number of seats allocated to the autonomous Kurdistan province, were pressured into voting it by the US officials. Shaho Saed, a member of the Goran opposition movement present during the negotiations held by the Americans, reports the threats made to sideline Kurdistan would the troublesome Kurds not comply to the American agenda, which has been the main preoccupation of the electoral law issue.
As a result, Kurdistan finds itself with a diminished representation in the assembly to come. On 325 seats, they will have 41. It will dilute significantly their influence in Baghdad, and makes the implementation of the article 140 even less likely than in the past.
At the heart of the tenses between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government are lying the disputed territories, including Kirkuk. Those are areas claimed by the Kurds, but outside their boundaries. An article of the Iraqi constitution, the article 140, states that a census, followed by a referendum, will determine the fate of the territories.
The census was to be carried at the end of 2007. But until now, the Iraqi government reported it, effectively prolonging a status quo in which Kirkuk and its crucial petrol resources were kept away from the Kurds.
During the january 2009 provincial elections, Iraq prime minister Nouri al-Maliki made no secret of his plans to modify the Iraqi constitution. He favours a strong central state, as opposed to the project of a federal state the Kurds wanted.
In agreeing to a reduced number of parliamentarians in the national assembly, the Kurd representatives may have given up the claims on Kirkuk. The real autonomy the control of the town could have given to Kurdistan is now compromised. Effectively, the province will remain dependent to Baghdad.
The Kurdistan Alliance, the coalition of the two parties sharing power in Kurdistan, the PUK and the KDP, were at pain to present the electoral law as a step forward, while the opposition in Kurdistan denounced it as a capitulation.
In an official statement released just after the electoral law was passed, the USA are asserting their support to a census taking place in 2010, and to the article 140. But, in the same text, they mention as well the article 142, allowing to amend the constitution. It doesn't augur well for the Kurdish claims, especially when the Iraqi vice-president Tareq al-Hashimi, who originally vetoed the law on the behalf of the Sunni arab faction, talk about is satisfaction to have gained concessions and says the task is now to reinforce "unity".
Kemal Kerkuki, Kurdistan's regional assembly speaker, and Kosrat Rasul, the KRG vice-president, were tuesday and wednesday in Baghdad engaged in a succession of meetings, trying to secure guarantees and alliances. Kosrat Rasul spoke on PUKmedia.net, the PUK mouthpiece, of the necessity to build a front with other non-Kurd parties, as during the Saddam Hussein years. A reference to the "unity" praised by Tareq al-Hashimi? The Iraqi vice-president represents the Sunnis, who lost their privileges after the dictator's fall. He wants the de-baathication policy to be halted, if not reversed, asserting it harms principally the Sunnis and bars them to hold a significant position in the new Iraq.
The Kurd leaders now under double pressure. They have to face some national elections promising them a reduced representation at the national assembly, and the discontent of their people, who feel their delegates surrendered their demands.
There is, nonetheless, nothing to rejoice about. The text was voted unanimously, it is true, but there was only 138 parliamentarians on the 275 the Baghdad assembly actually has, 138 being the minimum required by the constitution for a parliamentary session to be held. It took the whole sunday and last minute phone calls from Barack Obama and Joe Biden to muster this number, and have the law passed at 23:50, ten minutes before the ultimate deadline.
The law could be passed because the Kurd representatives, who were contesting the number of seats allocated to the autonomous Kurdistan province, were pressured into voting it by the US officials. Shaho Saed, a member of the Goran opposition movement present during the negotiations held by the Americans, reports the threats made to sideline Kurdistan would the troublesome Kurds not comply to the American agenda, which has been the main preoccupation of the electoral law issue.
As a result, Kurdistan finds itself with a diminished representation in the assembly to come. On 325 seats, they will have 41. It will dilute significantly their influence in Baghdad, and makes the implementation of the article 140 even less likely than in the past.
At the heart of the tenses between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government are lying the disputed territories, including Kirkuk. Those are areas claimed by the Kurds, but outside their boundaries. An article of the Iraqi constitution, the article 140, states that a census, followed by a referendum, will determine the fate of the territories.
The census was to be carried at the end of 2007. But until now, the Iraqi government reported it, effectively prolonging a status quo in which Kirkuk and its crucial petrol resources were kept away from the Kurds.
During the january 2009 provincial elections, Iraq prime minister Nouri al-Maliki made no secret of his plans to modify the Iraqi constitution. He favours a strong central state, as opposed to the project of a federal state the Kurds wanted.
In agreeing to a reduced number of parliamentarians in the national assembly, the Kurd representatives may have given up the claims on Kirkuk. The real autonomy the control of the town could have given to Kurdistan is now compromised. Effectively, the province will remain dependent to Baghdad.
The Kurdistan Alliance, the coalition of the two parties sharing power in Kurdistan, the PUK and the KDP, were at pain to present the electoral law as a step forward, while the opposition in Kurdistan denounced it as a capitulation.
In an official statement released just after the electoral law was passed, the USA are asserting their support to a census taking place in 2010, and to the article 140. But, in the same text, they mention as well the article 142, allowing to amend the constitution. It doesn't augur well for the Kurdish claims, especially when the Iraqi vice-president Tareq al-Hashimi, who originally vetoed the law on the behalf of the Sunni arab faction, talk about is satisfaction to have gained concessions and says the task is now to reinforce "unity".
Kemal Kerkuki, Kurdistan's regional assembly speaker, and Kosrat Rasul, the KRG vice-president, were tuesday and wednesday in Baghdad engaged in a succession of meetings, trying to secure guarantees and alliances. Kosrat Rasul spoke on PUKmedia.net, the PUK mouthpiece, of the necessity to build a front with other non-Kurd parties, as during the Saddam Hussein years. A reference to the "unity" praised by Tareq al-Hashimi? The Iraqi vice-president represents the Sunnis, who lost their privileges after the dictator's fall. He wants the de-baathication policy to be halted, if not reversed, asserting it harms principally the Sunnis and bars them to hold a significant position in the new Iraq.
The Kurd leaders now under double pressure. They have to face some national elections promising them a reduced representation at the national assembly, and the discontent of their people, who feel their delegates surrendered their demands.
samedi 5 décembre 2009
The Kirkuk impasse
The electoral law for the Iraqi national elections has still to be approved. A first version, presented to the Baghdad parliament after weeks of difficult negotiations between Iraqi lawmakers, was adopted after heavy pressure from both the US and the UN. It was immediately rejected by the Sunni vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi, on the grounds that the law was not giving a proper representation to the refugees, mainly Sunnis, who fled Iraq for fear of sectarian violence and are now living in neighbouring countries. The system of allocation of seats was contested by the Kurds as well, and a second version of the law was drafted, in which some seats, initially attributed to the Sunnis, are given to the Kurds.
The Arab Sunni politicians didn't attend the vote at the Baghdad parliament as a form of protest. To avoid another veto by Tariq al-Hashimi, further negotiations were held, destined to bring the different sides to a compromise.
But, to date, nothing emerged.
The opposite factions appear to adopt an attitude of no concessions, effectively paralysing the process. When he received the UN special envoy in Erbil yesterday, the president of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said that the Kurds would not accept the present system of seats allocation, which is reducing their representation in Baghdad. If the present system was maintained, he added, the Kurds would so ask for a census to be held, to have a definitive image of the Iraqi population, and so be able to give representation accordingly to reliable datas.
This statement is a barely veiled threat on Iraq's stability.
The Iraqi government carefully avoids to hold any census. It has the potential to sparkle a new round of sectarian cleansing. The risks are to see the different factions bringing people in the contested areas to shift the demographic advantage in their favour. It would go, of course, with a campaign of intimidations, if not of violences, to push away residents from other communities.
At the heart of the problem is the city of Kirkuk, originally the reason of the endless wrangling which delayed the drafting of the electoral law.
The city lies on the fringes of the autonomous Kurdistan and is claimed by the Kurds as theirs. They ask for a census to be held to determine if Kirkuk must remain under the control of the central government or if it must be included in the Kurdistan region.
The Iraqi constitution states that the issue of the contested territories, including Kirkuk, will be solved by such a way. But the central governments refuses to implement it. After the 2003 American invasion, the Kurds came massively in the oil-rich city, and any census would give them a clear majority. A return of Kirkuk under the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government means an important step towards their dream of an independent Kurdish state. For the central government, it would mean the loss of a strategic asset, and of a significant loss of income. At term, possibly even the fracture of the state.
Massoud Barzani is not the only one to bring the problem of the electoral law back to Kirkuk. In an interview given the 24/11/2009 Jawar Namiq, former speaker of the Kurdistan region parliament, declared that the Kurd lawmakers in Baghdad should never have approved the amended version of the electoral law, that the actual issue was Kirkuk and the way it was addressed in the law, which states that while the vote would be held, a special disposition would have the results open to negotiation during one year.
The Kurd politician Mahmoud Othman, member of the Iraqi national assembly, says that an election relying on an inaccurate system of seats repartition would have no credibility. It would be better, he says, to report the polls until a proper census is conducted.
These interventions are following efforts from the Kurdistan Regional Government to reinforce the links between the province and Kirkuk. Kurdistan's prime minister Bahram Salih went the 24/11/2009 in the town to deliver a message of support, in which he reasserted the determination of the KRG to resolve any issue accordingly to the constitution. And this despite any external interference - a clear reference to the UN attempts to bring the Kurds to accept a special status for Kirkuk. He called as well for an improved coordination between the KRG and the Kirkuk's administration.
The same day was announced a project to build a railroad between Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. A way to bring the contested town closer to Kurdistan.
These moves are provoking bitter opposition from the Arabs and Turkmens from Kirkuk, who fear to be marginalised and are worrying about the Kurds nationalist claims. Yesterday, the Arab parties called vice president al-Hashimi to reject the electoral law if the present version was not amended, and said they would boycott the polls unless some guarantees were given to the minorities and a special status given to Kirkuk. One of them, Sheikh Abdullah Sami al-Hassi, said that they would even take to the streets to oppose the law.
This worrying statement mirrors the one made by a leader of al-Sawha, former Sunni insurgents turned pro-governmental militias, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, who accused the Kurds of stealing Kirkuk.
The situation is so in a dangerous impasse. Today, the Sunni parliamentarians didn't attend the assembly, meaning there wasn't enough representatives to hold a session. As a result, the contentious electoral law can't even be discussed.
The Arab Sunni politicians didn't attend the vote at the Baghdad parliament as a form of protest. To avoid another veto by Tariq al-Hashimi, further negotiations were held, destined to bring the different sides to a compromise.
But, to date, nothing emerged.
The opposite factions appear to adopt an attitude of no concessions, effectively paralysing the process. When he received the UN special envoy in Erbil yesterday, the president of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, said that the Kurds would not accept the present system of seats allocation, which is reducing their representation in Baghdad. If the present system was maintained, he added, the Kurds would so ask for a census to be held, to have a definitive image of the Iraqi population, and so be able to give representation accordingly to reliable datas.
This statement is a barely veiled threat on Iraq's stability.
The Iraqi government carefully avoids to hold any census. It has the potential to sparkle a new round of sectarian cleansing. The risks are to see the different factions bringing people in the contested areas to shift the demographic advantage in their favour. It would go, of course, with a campaign of intimidations, if not of violences, to push away residents from other communities.
At the heart of the problem is the city of Kirkuk, originally the reason of the endless wrangling which delayed the drafting of the electoral law.
The city lies on the fringes of the autonomous Kurdistan and is claimed by the Kurds as theirs. They ask for a census to be held to determine if Kirkuk must remain under the control of the central government or if it must be included in the Kurdistan region.
The Iraqi constitution states that the issue of the contested territories, including Kirkuk, will be solved by such a way. But the central governments refuses to implement it. After the 2003 American invasion, the Kurds came massively in the oil-rich city, and any census would give them a clear majority. A return of Kirkuk under the administration of the Kurdistan Regional Government means an important step towards their dream of an independent Kurdish state. For the central government, it would mean the loss of a strategic asset, and of a significant loss of income. At term, possibly even the fracture of the state.
Massoud Barzani is not the only one to bring the problem of the electoral law back to Kirkuk. In an interview given the 24/11/2009 Jawar Namiq, former speaker of the Kurdistan region parliament, declared that the Kurd lawmakers in Baghdad should never have approved the amended version of the electoral law, that the actual issue was Kirkuk and the way it was addressed in the law, which states that while the vote would be held, a special disposition would have the results open to negotiation during one year.
The Kurd politician Mahmoud Othman, member of the Iraqi national assembly, says that an election relying on an inaccurate system of seats repartition would have no credibility. It would be better, he says, to report the polls until a proper census is conducted.
These interventions are following efforts from the Kurdistan Regional Government to reinforce the links between the province and Kirkuk. Kurdistan's prime minister Bahram Salih went the 24/11/2009 in the town to deliver a message of support, in which he reasserted the determination of the KRG to resolve any issue accordingly to the constitution. And this despite any external interference - a clear reference to the UN attempts to bring the Kurds to accept a special status for Kirkuk. He called as well for an improved coordination between the KRG and the Kirkuk's administration.
The same day was announced a project to build a railroad between Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk. A way to bring the contested town closer to Kurdistan.
These moves are provoking bitter opposition from the Arabs and Turkmens from Kirkuk, who fear to be marginalised and are worrying about the Kurds nationalist claims. Yesterday, the Arab parties called vice president al-Hashimi to reject the electoral law if the present version was not amended, and said they would boycott the polls unless some guarantees were given to the minorities and a special status given to Kirkuk. One of them, Sheikh Abdullah Sami al-Hassi, said that they would even take to the streets to oppose the law.
This worrying statement mirrors the one made by a leader of al-Sawha, former Sunni insurgents turned pro-governmental militias, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, who accused the Kurds of stealing Kirkuk.
The situation is so in a dangerous impasse. Today, the Sunni parliamentarians didn't attend the assembly, meaning there wasn't enough representatives to hold a session. As a result, the contentious electoral law can't even be discussed.
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